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ARTICLES

HOMOSEXUAL RIGHTS AND CITIZEN INITIATIVES:
IS CONSTITUTIONALISM
UNCONSTITUTIONAL?
RicHARD F. DUNCAN*
GARY L. YOUNG**
I.

INTRODUCTION

Although the laws of at least 23 states continue to treat
homosexual sodomy as a criminal offense,' a small but increasing
number of states recently have begun to move in the opposite
direction by enacting homosexual rights legislation. When Minnesota enacted what has been called America's "most compre* Sherman S. Welpton, Jr. Professor of Law, University of Nebraska
College of Law.
** Co-Publisher, COMMON PRACFCE, a monthly publication on the
Church and Society
1. See ALA. CODE § 13A-6-65(a)(3) (1994); Aiuz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 131411 to 13-1412 (1989); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-122 (Michie 1993); FLA. STAT.
§ 800.02 (West 1992 & Supp. 1994); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (1992); IDAHO
CODE § 18-6605 (1987 & Supp. 1994); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3505 (1988 & Supp.
1994); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:89 (West 1986 & Supp. 1994); MD. ANN. CODE.
Art. 27, §§ 553-554 (1992 & Supp. 1993); MIcH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 750.158,
750.338 - 750.338(b) (West 1991); MINN. STAT. § 609.293 (1988); Miss. CODE
ANN. § 97-29-59 (1972 & 1994 Replacement Volume); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 566.090
(Vernon 1979 & Supp. 1994); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 45-2-101(20), 45-5-505
(1993); NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 201.190 (Michie 1992 & Supp. 1993); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 14-177 (1993); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 886 (West 1983); R.I. GEN.
LAws § 11-10-1 (1981 & Supp. 1993); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-120 (Law. Co-op.
1985 & Supp. 1993); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-510 (1994); TEx. PENAL CODE
ANN. §§ 21,01(1), 21.06 (West 1989 & Supp. 1994); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-403
(1990 & Supp. 1994); VA. CODE ANN. § 18-2-361 (Michie 1988 & Supp. 1994).
The Kentucky statute criminalizing sodomy, see Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 510.100
(Baldwin 1994), was declared unconstitutional in Commonwealth v. Wasson,
842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992). The Massachusetts statute prohibiting "the
abominable and detestable crime against nature," see MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 272,
§ 34 (Law Co-op. 1993), was arguably invalidated as applied to private
consensual conduct by Commonwealth v. Balthazar, 366 Mass. 298, 302, 318
N.E.2d 478, 481 (1974). See also EDrroRs OF HARVARD LAW REVIEW, SEXUAL
ORIENTATION AND THE LAw 9-10, n.2 (1990).
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hensive gay rights law" 2 in early 1993, it became the eighth state
to pass antidiscrimination laws protecting sexual inclinations and
behavior.3 A number of cities and counties also have passed similar restrictions on private employers and landlords.4
However, a libertarian counter-trend may be developing.
Congress has consistently rejected efforts to amend tide VII
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act to cover sexual orientation as a
protected characteristic. 5 Moreover, in a statewide initiative in
Colorado, and in a number of local initiatives across the country, the people have acted to protect themselves against restrictive homosexual rights laws.6 . The success of citizen initiatives
rejecting special rights for homosexuals 7 has led homosexual
2. The Minnesota Mode, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 24, 1993, at 26.
3. See CAL. CIVIL CODE § 51.7 (West Supp. 1994); CAL. LABOR CODE
§ 1102.1 (West 1989 & Supp. 1994); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-81a - 46a-81r

(West 1986 & Supp. 1994); HAw. REV. STAT. §§ 378-1, 378-3 (1994); MASS. ANN.
LAws. ch. 151B, §§ 3, 4 (Law Co-op. 1989 & Supp. 1994); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 363 (West 1991 & Supp. 1994); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:5-5, 10:5-12 (West 1993
& Supp. 1994) VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 143 (Supp. 1993), tit. 9, §§ 4503-4504
(1993), tit. 21, § 495 (Supp. 1993); WIs. STAT. ANN. §§ 101.22, 111.32 (West
1988 & Supp. 1993). See also D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-2501 to 1-2533 (1981 & Cum.
Supp. 1994).
4. A recent student Note reports that at least 139 jurisdictions have
adopted some form of homosexual rights legislation. Note, ConstitutionalLimits
On Anti-Gay-Rights Initiatives, 106 HARv. L. REv. 1905, 1905 (1993). For a list of
these jurisdictions, see id. at 1923-25.
5. See EDITORS OF HARVARD LAw REVIEW, supra note 1, at 68-69.
6. Voters in Cincinnati, Ohio; Lewiston, Maine; Portsmouth, New
Hampshire; and several communities in Oregon have recently voted to reject
special rights for homosexuals. See Timothy Egan, Voters in Oregon Back Local
Anti-Gay Rules, N.Y. TimEs, July 1, 1993, at Al0; Timothy Egan, Propositions:Ballot
Measures on Term Limits and Crime Draw Wide Support N.Y. TiMES, Nov. 4,1993, at
A24. Similar grass roots campaigns to protect civil liberties against restrictive
homosexual rights laws are also being waged in Arizona, Missouri, Oregon,
Idaho, Michigan, Nevada, and Washington. See Bettina Boxall, Anti-gay-rights
Measures Ignite Aggressive Battles in 7 States, L.A. TimEs, June 9, 1994, at A5.
Although some of these initiative campaigns have failed to qualify for inclusion
on 1994 ballots, the citizens of Oregon and Idaho will vote on the issue in
November. See Petitions Presentedto Block Gay Rights, WASH. TIMES,July 9, 1994, at
AS; Marty Trillhaase, Anti Gay Rights Debate Begins 4-Month Run, IDAHO FALLS
POST REGISTER, July 7, 1994, at Al, AS.

7. We use the term "special rights" advisedly. When proponents of
homosexual rights legislation argue that they are seeking nothing more for
homosexuals than the same civil rights everyone else has, they are wrong for
two reasons. First, homosexuals already have the same rights everyone else has
the right to be protected against discrimination on the basis of their race,
gender, religion, age, and disability. Second, since the general rule continues
to be one of mutual consent and free choice in matters of housing and
employment, homosexuality is merely one of countless activities left
unprotected by antidiscrimination laws. See Richard F. Duncan, Wo Wants To
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rights advocates to turn to the courts to reverse the will of the
people."
Gay rights supporters have viewed the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as their last best hope for
constitutional protection of homosexuality since Bowers v. Hardwick9 was decided in 1986. In Hardwick, the Court conclusively
held that there is no fundamental right under the Due Process
Clause to engage in consensual homosexual sodomy. However,
as noted by many commentators, Hardwick did not address
whether the Equal Protection Clause provided the. constitutional
resources to protect homosexuals from governmental discrimination. In one response to Hardwick, Professor Cass Sunstein
argues that the structural distinctions between the Due Process
Clause and the Equal Protection Clause are also substantive: i.e.
the Equal Protection Clause will bear some fundamental rights
which do not exist under the Due Process Clause.1" Homosexual
rights advocates have insisted that the right to be free from discrimination based upon one's homosexuality is located in one of
these rights.'1
Sunstein accepts Hardwick's holding .that rights under the
Due Process Clause are limited to those grounded historically as
"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" or "deeply rooted in
this Nation's history and tradition.""2 On the other hand, the
Equal Protection Clause, Sunstein muses, "is a self-conscious
repudiation of history and tradition as defining constitutional
principles.""3 Where the Due Process Clause is backward looking, the Equal Protection Clause is forward looking. "Analysis of
an equal protection. claim therefore proceeds along an entirely
Stop The Church: Homosexual Rights Legislation, PublicPolicy, And Religious Freedom,
69 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 393, 399-401 (1994).

. 8. See Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270 (Colo. 1993) (en banc) (Colorado's
Amendment Two initiative); Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City
of Cincinnati, 860 F. Supp. 417 (S.D. Ohio 1994) (Cincinnati charter
amendment).
9. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
10. Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual Orientationand the Constitution: A Note on the
Relationship between Due Process and Equal Protection, 55 U.

CHI.

L. Rxv. 1161

(1988).
11. See, e.g., Janet Halley, The Politics of the Closet: Towards Equal Protection
for Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Identity, 36 UCLA L. REv. 915 (1989).

12. See Sunstein, supra note 10, at 1168. We do not mean to suggest that
Sunstein agrees with the holding of Hardwick. He clearly does not. IcL at 117374.
13.

Id. at 1168. But see Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 67

(1872) (noting that the historical setting of the Civil War Amendments "cannot
fail to have an important bearing on any question of doubt concerning their
true meaning.").
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distinct track," and as such, "a class that includes people who
engage in acts substantively unprotected by the Due Process
Clause can be entitled to judicial protection against official discrimination."14 Thus, Sunstein concludes - in a bit of sage:
"constitutional protection against discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation will ultimately take place under the Equal Protection Clause. It should be unsurprising if such developments
occur even in the wake of Bowers v. Hardwick""5
Given these high expectations, it is hard not to sympathize
with the Colorado Supreme Court when faced with Evans v.
Romer, 6 the recent challenge to Colorado's now famous Amendment Two. Amendment Two is the Colorado voter initiative to
amend Colorado's state constitution to proscribe the enactment
of legislation which would grant special rights to homosexuals. 1"
Specifically, Amendment Two forbids government action which
recognizes homosexuality or bisexuality as grounds for "minority
status [or] quota preferences," as support for designation as a
protected class, or as the basis for a claim of discrimination."8
Whatever its constitutional viability, Amendment Two has
provoked a sharp - often hysterical - response in certain powerful segments of society.1 9 Various gay rights groups and mem14. Sunstein, supra note 10, at 1168.
15. Id. at 1179. See also Halley, supra note 11.
16. 854 P.2d 1270 (Colo. 1993) (en banc). Following the court's decision
in Evans, the case was remanded to the trial court and once again came before
the Colorado Supreme Court. See Evans v. Romer, Nos. 94SA48, 94SA128, 1994
Colo. LEXIS 779 (Colo. Oct. 11, 1994) (hereinafter cited as "Evans IT). The
court refused to reconsider the constitutional principles it had articulated in
the original Evans decision. Id. at *11.

17. See supra note 7.
18. If Evans had lifted the preliminary injunction, Amendment Two
would have been COLO. CoNST. Art. II, § 30b:
No Protected Status Based on Homosexual, Lesbian or Bisexual
Orientation. Neither the State of Colorado, through any of its
branches or departments, nor any of its agencies, political
subdivisions, municipalities or school districts, shall enact, adopt or
enforce any statute, regulation, ordinance or policy whereby
homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or
relationships shall constitute or otherwise be the basis of or entitle any
person or class of persons to have or claim any minority status, quota
preferences, protected status or claim of discrimination. This Section
of the Constitution shall be in all respects self-executing.
19. We use the term "hysterical" advisedly. Opponents of Amendment
Two have denounced proponents of the measure as bigots, homophobes, and
haters. One man, already dying of AIDS, even committed suicide and left a
note blaming Amendment Two for his decision to take his own life. See, e.g.,
Gary Lee, More GroupsJoin Boycott of Colorado;Protest Grows Against Anti-Gay Rights
Law, WASH. PosT, Dec. 23, 1992, at A13; Mark Shaffer, Colorado Battling Boycott
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bers of the entertainment industry have been particularly hostile
to the Colorado voters, denouncing them as "homophobic" and
advocating boycotts of Colorado's tourism market until the
amendment's repeal. Not surprisingly, these appeals of political
activists are more emotional rhetoric and ad hominem than
sophisticated legal or moral arguments that homosexuality
deserves governmental endorsement. Nevertheless, even those
in the legal community who have discussed Amendment Two
have been unable to resist engaging20in reductionistic hyperbole
regarding Colorado and its citizens.
Presumably, simple political outrage does not jurisprudence
make. Two things would have made the court's job much easier
as it faced this politically volatile amendment. First, of course,
the Colorado voters could have simply had a different will and
rejected the initiative. However, Amendment Two was a substantial success in the voting booth: 813,966 (53.4%) voted for the
amendment, while 710,151 (46.6%) voted against it.21 In a state
the size of Colorado, 100,000 votes is a substantial margin.
Second, Amendment Two could also have been dispensed
with more readily if homosexuals were considered a "suspect
class," thereby provoking strict scrutiny under the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. This solution was ruled
out as well, however, because22it is well established that homosexuals are not a "suspect class."
Thus, the only colorable option 23 that remained if the court
were to rule against the constitutionality of Amendment Two was
Over Anti-Gay Law, NEw ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Jan. 10, 1993, at A3.

Regrettably, this irrational fervor has even spread to the pages of prestigious law
reviews. For example, a student note critical of Amendment Two repeatedly
railed against "right-wing, fundamentalist Christian groups," the "homophobic
right," and other demons of the author's own imagining. See Note,
ConstitutionalLimits On Anti-Gay-Rights Initiatives, 106 HAv. L. REv. 1905, 1909,
1910 (1993). A law professor went so far as to compare supporters of
Amendment Two with the Ku Klux Klan. Charlene L. Smith, Undo Two: An
Essay Regarding Colorado's Anti-Lesbian and Gay Amendment 2, 32 WASHBURN L.J.
367 (1993).
20. See supra note 19. The citizens of Colorado, however, seem unfazed
by the hysteria brought about by their democratic choices. Indeed, popular
support for Amendment Two has increased in the months following its passage.
See WASH. Posr, Jan. 4, 1993, at A9.
21. See Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1272 (Colo. 1993).
22. See infra notes 29-64 and accompanying text.
23. The plaintiffs in the case also presented several other challenges to
Amendment Two. For example, they argued that Amendment Two: violates
the plaintiffs' rights to free association and expression; violates the plaintiffs'
First Amendment right to petition government for a redress of grievances; is
unconstitutionally vague; violates the guarantee to have a republican form of
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the second prong of equal protection jurisprudence, which
engages strict scrutiny if a court finds that a "fundamental right"
is infringed by a legislative classification. Thus, the challenge of
Evans was to find a fundamental right that Amendment Two
restricts. Given that initiatives and legislation similar to Amendment Two are being considered in a number of jurisdictions,
Evans is either the equal protection grail so desperately sought by
those who seek to undermine voter initiatives like Amendment
Two, or it is a signal of the - strength of similar amendments
against equal protection challenges. As we will see, litigants
whose sensibilities are offended by similar voter initiatives face a
difficult constitutional challenge, and Evans' attempt at a solution is unsuccessful.
II.

STRICT SCRUTINY AND AMENDMENT

Two

Legislation - or in this case, a state constitutional amendment - challenged on equal protection grounds generally is
presumed to be valid if the classification involved in the legislation is "rationally related to a legitimate state interest."24 Therefore, "[w] hen social or economic legislation is at issue, the Equal
Protection Clause allows the States wide latitude, and the Constitution presumes that even improvident decisions will eventually
be rectified by the democratic processes." 5 However, legislative
classifications are subject to review by more exacting standards in
some cases. Legislation is subject to "strict scrutiny" if it fits in
one of two descriptive categories: - 1) the legislation makes a clas26
sification involving members of traditionally "suspect classes;"
or 2) the law creates a classification which infringes on a "fundamental constitutional right."27 Laws that fit in these categories
will survive strict scrutiny only if they are necessary to effectuate a
compelling state interest and are narrowly drawn to achieve that
interest in the least restrictive manner possible.28
government under Art. IV, § 4 of the United States Constitution; violates
Colorado's constitutional limits on the power of initiatives; and violates the
Supremacy Clause, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and
the access to courts clause of the Colorado Constitution. See Plaintiffs'
Amended Complaint at 6-12, Evans (No. 93SA17). Neither the trial court nor
the Colorado Supreme Court addressed these arguments, preferring instead to
rely on the equal protection issues involved. Evans, 854 P.2d at 1274.
24. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440
(1985). See F.C.C. v. Beach Communications, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2096, 2101
(1993).
25. Ceburne, 473 U.S. at 440 (citations omitted).
26. Id.
27.

Id.

28.

Id. See also Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216-17 (1982).
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A.

Suspect Classes and Equal Protection

It is well established in the federal circuit courts that homosexuals do not constitute a "suspect" or a "quasi-suspect" class
under the Equal Protection Clause.'
Although a full-scale
defense of these cases is beyond the scope of this Article, the
following discussion will briefly outline the reasons why it is
unlikely that the Supreme Court will soon expand its suspect
class doctrine to include homosexuals.
Typically, courts have "based their analyses of suspect or
quasi-suspect classes on the model of race, the only criterion that
uncontestedly entails a suspect classification."3 0 Groups seeking
suspect status must have characteristics that "resemble race to
some largely unelucidated [sic] degree."3 1 One problematic
test,32 which is nevertheless useful for present. purposes, states
that to qualify as "suspect" or "quasi-suspect," a class of persons
must meet three requirements. Members of the class must: 1)
exhibit a trait that is immutable and highly visible and "which
automatically consigns an individual to a general category (such
as race or gender), often implying the inferiority of the person so
categorized;"3 3 2) have suffered under a history of pervasive discrimination or been subjected "to unique disabilities on the basis
of stereotyped characteristics not truly indicative of their abilities;"34 and, 3) have been "relegated to such a position of polit29. See, e.g., High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895
F.2d 563, 571 (9th Cir. 1990); Ben Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454,464 (7th Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1004 (1990); Woodward y. U.S., 871 F.2d 1068, 1076
(Fed. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1003 (1990); Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d
97, 102-103 (D.C. Cir. 1987); National Gay Task Force v. Board of Education,
729 F.2d 1270, 1273 (10th Cir. 1984), aff'd, 470 U.S. 903 (1985). But see
Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc.. v. City of Cincinnati, 860 F. Supp.
417, 436 (S.D. Ohio 1994) (homosexuals treated as a "quasi-suspect" class).
30. Note, The ConstitutionalStatus of Sexual Orientation: Homosexuality As a
Suspect Classification,98 HAnv. L. Rxv. 1285, 1298 (1985).
31. Id.
32. One commentator notes that "[wJhatjudicial elucidation there is has
developed sporadically in the context of particular cases, and has given rise to
an ambiguous catalogue of characteristics of suspectness that yields no obvious
or coherent theory of suspect classifications." Id.
33. Kenneth L. Karst, The Supreme Court 1976 Term, Forward: Equal
Citizenship Underthe FourteenthAmendment, 91 HIAv. L. REv. 1, 23 (1977). See also
High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 573 (homosexuals do not constitute a suspect or
quasi-suspect class).
34. Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313
(1976). In Murgia, the Court held that the elderly are not a suspect class and
proceeded to apply the rational basis test in upholding a Massachusetts law
prescribing mandatory retirement for state police officers at age 50.
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ical powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from
the majoritarian political process." 5
The Ninth Circuit's recent analysis of whether homosexuals
constitute a suspect class is typical. In High Tech Gays v. Defense
Industry Security Clearance Office,36 the court considered whether
the Department of Defense's policy of subjecting all homosexual
applicants for security clearances to extended background
checks violated their right to equal protection. In a thoughtfully
reasoned opinion, the court concluded that homosexuals do not
constitute a suspect or quasi-suspect class under the tripartite
test.
The court conceded - perhaps too quickly - that homosexuals have suffered a history of discrimination." However,
homosexuals did not satisfy the two remaining criteria. The
court found that homosexuality was behavioral and was not
immutable. It differed from suspect classes - such as race because unlike homosexuality "[t] he behavior or conduct of such
already recognized classes is irrelevant to their identification."'
Also, the court found that homosexuals, far from being politi35. Id.
36. 895 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1990).
37. Id. at 573. Although many homosexuals, like almost everyone else,
undoubtedly have been discriminated against in employment and housing on
occasion, the available evidence indicates that the discrimination is neither
pervasive nor economically devastating. In fact, according to data gathered in
the 1990 U.S. Census and several other studies, male homosexual households
ranked at the top in terms of average annual household income. See Duncan,
supra note 7, at 407-09. A recent study advocating the amendment of
antidiscrimination laws to include sexual orientation as a protected category
attempts to justify this position by establishing that homosexuals earn less than
similarly-situated heterosexuals. See M.V. Lee Badgett, The Wage Effects of Sexual
OrientationDiscrimination,Industrial & Labor Relations Review (forthcoming).
This study, however, has many serious methodological flaws. For example, the
study is limited to a sample of only 34 lesbian or bisexual women and only 47
gay or bisexual men. And even these small samples are inflated because the
study defined a lesbian/gay/bisexual as anyone having reported "at least one
same-sex sexual partner since the age of 18." Id. (Manuscript Table 2).
Although the study controls for a number of factors related to earnings, such as
education, occupation, marital status, and experience, it fails to control for
health despite evidence that homosexuals (particularly homosexual men)
experience many health problems not shared by heterosexuals. See infra note
54. Given that absenteeism and other health-related problems may affect job
performance (and, therefore, compensation), this omission is problematic.
Moreover, the study lacked a variable measuring the extent of workplace
disclosure of homosexuality or bisexuality, a serious omission since, as Prof.
Badgett admits, "disclosure is necessary for direct discrimination." Badgett,
supra. Finally, the study's results concerning an earnings disparity for lesbian
and bisexual women were not statistically significant. See id.
38. High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 573-74.
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cally powerless, have both the resources and the ability to attract
the attention of lawmakers throughout the nation. 9 Because
homosexuals did not meet these two elements, they did not qualify as a suspect or quasi-suspect class.4 °
The Ninth Circuit's conclusion in High Tech Gays is clearly
correct. The Equal Protection Clause was designed primarily to
eliminate racial discrimination 41 and "only those classifications
that are 'like race' in some relevant sense can responsibly be
accorded similar treatment." 4 2 As Justice Rehnquist once put it,
the problem presented by the Equal Protection Clause is one of
sorting through mounds of perfectly legitimate legislative distinctions in order to isolate and invalidate
those few "which involve
4
invidiously unequal treatment."

To date, the Supreme Court has identified only three classes
(race, ethnicity, and, at least sometimes, alienage) as suspect and
only two (gender and illegitimacy) as quasi-suspect." When
39. Id. at 574. As Judge Richard Posner observes in his recent analysis of
sex and public policy, homosexuals "have become a political force to be
reckoned with." RICHRDa A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 292 (1992). See also
Jeffrey Schmalz, Gay Politics Goes Mainstream, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 11, 1992, § 6
(Magazine), at 21 ("it is clear that homosexuals have crossed a threshold,
becoming an integral part of American political life"). The political power of
homosexuals is not surprising, because small, special interest groups "are
exactly the groups that are likely to obtain disproportionately large benefits
from the political process." Geoffrey P. Miller, The True Sto of CaroleneProducts,
1987 Sup. CT. REv. 397, 428.
40. High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 574.
41. As Justice Miller observed more than 100 years ago, the Civil War
Amendments share one pervading purpose - "the freedom of the slave race,
the security and firm establishment of that freedom, and the protection of the
newly-made freeman and citizen from the oppression of those who had
formerly exercised unlimited dominion over him." Slaughter-House Cases, 83
U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 71 (1872). Specifically with respect to the Equal Protection
Clause, the Slaughter-HouseCourt found that state laws which discriminated with
gross injustice against the newly-emancipated African-Americans were "the evil
to be remedied by this clause, and by it such laws are forbidden." Id. at 81. See
also Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880). For a scholarly analysis of
the original understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment, see Alexander M.
Bickel, The OriginalUnderstandingAnd The SegregationDecision, 69 HARv. L. Rev.
1 (1955).
42. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY
REvIEw 149 (1980).

AND

DIsTRUsr: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL

43. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 779 (1977) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
44. See Craig C. Burke, Note, Fencing Out Politically Unpopular Groupsfrom
the Normal PoliticalProcesses: The Equal Protection Concerns of Colorado Amendment
Two, 69 IND. L.J. 275, 278-79 (1993). See, e.g. Richmond v.J.A. Croson Co., 488
U.S. 469, 493-95 (1989) (race); Korematsu v. U.S., 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944)
(ethnicity); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (alienage);
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these classes are broken down to basic elements, they share a
common denominator - a history of discrimination on the basis
of a morally neutral, non-behavioral characteristic. Classifications drawn along these lines serve no respectable purpose and
instead "are frequently the reflection of historic prejudices
rather than legislative rationality."4 5 In other words, "the doctrine of suspect classifications is a roundabout way of uncovering
official attempts to inflict inequality for its own sake - to treat a
group worse not in the service of some overriding social goal but
46
largely for the sake of simply disadvantaging its members."
Under this concept of suspectness, are classifications that disadvantage homosexuals similar to racial classifications?
A consensus has developed in our society around the central
insight of the civil rights movement, Dr. Martin Luther King's
perception that racial discrimination is invidious because people
should be judged by the content of their character, not by the
color of their skin. 47 Racial classifications are improper, therefore, not because race is immutable and inherent,4" but rather
Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723-24 (1982)
(gender); Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 265 (1978) (illegitimacy).
45. San Antonio Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 105 (1973) (Marshall
J., dissenting). See ELY, supra note 42, at 152.
46. ELY, supra note 42, at 153. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Center Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) (race, alienage, and national origin "are
so seldom relevant to the achievement of any legitimate state interest that laws
grounded in such considerations are deemed to reflect prejudice and
antipathy").
47. "I have a dream my four little children will one day live in a nation
where they will not be judged by the color of their skin but by the content of

their character." MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., I Have a Dream Address at the Lincoln
Memorial, in A TESTAMENT OF HOPE: THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS OF MARTIN
LUTHER KING,JR. 219 (J. Washington ed., 1991). Dr. King delivered this historic
address at the Lincoln Memorial on August 28, 1963. I. at 217. Dr. King's
insight suggests that people should be judged on the basis of what they do, and
not on the basis of their race or color. Similarly, in Frontiero v. Richardson,
411 U.S. 677 (1973) (plurality opinion), Justice Brennan argued that gender
classifications should be treated as suspect because they "violate 'the basic
concept of our system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to
individual responsibility .... '" Id. at 686 (quoting Weber v. Aetna Casualty &
Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972)). See also Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 217
n.14 (1982) ("Classifications treated as suspect tend to be irrelevant to any
proper legislative goal").
48. Immutability is neither necessary nor sufficient for suspect
classification. See ELY, supra note 42, at 150; Note, An Argumentfor the Application
of Equal Protection Heightened Scrutiny to Classifications Based on Homosexuality, 57
So. CAr_ L. REv. 797, 813 (1984). For example, even if blacks could take a safe,
inexpensive pill and become Caucasian, no one would argue seriously that
discrimination against blacks who declined the drug and chose to remain black
was any less invidious. Since race is irrelevant to character and abilities, racial
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because race is a morally neutral characteristic. Race- tells nothing about an individual's character or abilities.4 9
In contrast, legal distinctions drawn on the basis of socially
undesirable conduct, such as those disadvantaging burglars or
drug users, are clearly legitimate.5" These classifications are not
invidious, because they further legitimate societal goals by discouraging inappropriate or immoral behavior.5 " Laws prohibiting homosexual sodomy seem to fall in this category, because
they are the product of a sincere and reasonable societal objection to conduct deemed immoral,5 2 unnatural,5" or unhealthy.
discrimination is invidious even if race is a choice. See Duncan, supra note 7, at
402. On the other hand, classifications based on physical abilities and
intelligence are generally regarded as legitimate even though these
characteristics are immutable. See ELY, supranote 42, at 150; Note, supra, at 813.
49. Gen. Colin Powell, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was
criticized. recently by Rep. Patricia Schroeder for his support of the military's
ban on homosexuals. Rep. Schroeder complained that Powell's views were
similar to those once used against desegregating the military. General Powell,
who is black, informed Rep. Schroeder that he needed "no reminders
concerning the history of African-Americans" in the military and went on to
remind her of the difference between race and sexuality:
Skin color is a benign, non-behavioral characteristic. Sexual
orientation is perhaps the most profound of human behavioral
characteristics. Comparison of the two is a convenient but invalid
argument.
Elmo Zumwalt, Jr., GuidanceFrom Gen. Powel WASH. TimFs, June 4, 1992, at G3.
See also City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440
(1985) (race, alienage, and national origin are normally irrelevant to "the
achievement of any legitimate state interest").
50. See ELY, supra note 42, at 154. "[Wlhere individuals in the group
affected by a law have distinguishing characteristics relevant to interests the
State has author4y to implement, the courts have been very reluctant, as they
should be in our federal system and with respect for the separation of powers,
to closely scrutinize legislative choices [under the Equal Protection Clause]."
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 441-42 (1985)
(mentally retarded are not a quasi-suspect class entitled to a more exacting
standard of judicial review under the Equal Protection Clause).
51. See Paul Brest, The Substance of Process, 42 OHIo ST. L.J. 131, 136 (1981)
("it is entirely proper for the legislature to prohibit burglary and any-number of
other behaviors for reasons that ultimately rest on their immorality"). For
example, in Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 353 (1979) (plurality opinion), a
case in which the Supreme Court upheld a law denying biological fathers the
right to sue for the wrongful death of their illegitimate children,Justice Stewart
explained that under equal protection analysis it is "neither illogical nor unjust
for society to express its 'condemnation of irresponsible liaisons beyond the
bounds of marriage.'"
52. In his concurring opinion in Hardwick, Chief Justice Burger
summarized what he referred to as "millennia of moral teaching" about
homosexuality:
[Tihe proscriptions against sodomy have very "ancient roots."
Decisions of individuals relating to homosexual conduct have been
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subject to state intervention throughout the history of Western
civilization. Condemnation of those practices is firmly rooted in
Judeao-Christian [sic] moral and ethical standards. Homosexual
sodomy was a capital crime under Roman law. See Code Theod. 9.7.6;
Code Just. 9.9.31. See also D. Bailey, Homosexuality and the Western
Christian Tradition 70-81 (1975). During the English Reformation
when powers of the ecclesiastical courts were transferred to the King's
Courts, the first English statute criminalizing sodomy was passed. 25
Hen. VIII, ch. 6. Blackstone described "the infamous crime against
nature" as an offense of "deeper malignity" than rape, a heinous act
"the very mention of which is a disgrace to human nature," and "a
crime not fit to be named." 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *215. The
common law of England, including its prohibition of sodomy, became
the received law of Georgia and the other Colonies .... To hold that
the act of homosexual sodomy is somehow protected as a fundamental
right would be to cast aside millennia of moral teaching.
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196-97 (1986) (emphasis in original).
Our society's three major religions - Judaism, Christianity, and Islam historically have viewed homosexuality as immoral. See, e.g., The Jewish Torah
(Leviticus 18:22, 20:13), the New Testament (Romans 1:26-28, I Timothy 1:9-10, I
Corinthians6:9-10) and the Koran (The Heights 7:80). Many reputable modem
scholars also conclude that homosexuality is immoral. See, e.g., PAT~icK DEVUN,
THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS (1965); HARRY V. JAFFA, HoMosExuALry AND THE
NATURAL LAw (1990); RAMSEY COLLOQUIUM, The Homosexual Movemen FIRsr
THINGS 15 (Mar. 1994); John M. Finnis, Law, Morality, and "Sexual Orientation,"
69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1049 (1994);John M. Finnis, Legal Enforcement of "Duties
to Oneself": Kant v. Neo-Kantians,87 COLUM. L. REv. 433, 445-46 (1987). Finally,
"(a]ll three of the greatest Greek philosophers, Socrates, Plato and Aristotle,
regarded homosexual conduct as intrinsically shameful, immoral, and indeed
depraved or depraving." Finnis, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REv., supra,at 1055 (emphasis in original). But see Martha C. Nussbaum, Platonic Love and Colorado Law:
The Relevance ofAncient Greek Norms to Modern Sexual Controversies, 80 VA. L. REv.
1515 (1994) (responding to and disputing Professor Finnis' position).
53. See JAFFA, supra note 52. Plato observed that sexual pleasure was
"granted by nature to male and female when conjoined for the work of
procreation" and that "the crime of male with male, or female with female, is an
outrage on nature and a capital surrender to lust of pleasure." PLATO, LAws
§ 636, at 13 (A.E. Taylor trans. 1969). See also Finnis, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REv.,
supra note 52, at 1057.
54. See Warren Winkelstein,Jr., et al., Sexual Practicesand Risk of Infection by
the Human Immunodeficiency Virus: The San FranciscoMen's Health Study, 257JAMA
321 (1987). Dr. Winkelstein's findings "support the inference that sexual
transmission of HIV infection in homosexual/bisexual men in San Francisco,
during the current AIDS epidemic, has been largely a function of the numbers
of sexual contacts and the practice of receptive anal/genital contact among
them." Id. at 325. See also Lawrence A. Kingsley, et al., Sexual Transmission
Efficiency of HepatitisB Virus and Human Immunodeficiency Virus Among Homosexual
Men, 264 JAMA 230 (1990). Another scientific study of homosexual men
published in a leading medical journal found that "oral-anal sex with multiple
male partners carries an extremely high risk of intestinal infection." Thomas C.
Quinn, et al., The Polymicrobial Origin of Intestinal Infections In Homosexual Men,
309 NEW ENG. J. MED. 576, 582 (1983). Major Melissa Wells-Petry recently
conducted an exhaustive study of the scope, nature, and consequences of
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In this light, sodomy laws are no more suspicious than legislation
outlawing burglary or drug use.
But suppose instead of criminal laws prohibiting burglary or
sodomy a school district policy provides that anyone who admits
to being either a burglar or a homosexual may not be employed
as a teacher in any government school. 5 Although the state may
have a legitimate interest in discouraging theft and sodomy, does
this interest extend to the school district's policy?
Professor John Hart Ely believes the classification regarding
burglars is legitimate because it will discourage burglaries.5 6 Yet,
57
he condemns the classification of homosexuals as invidious
58
However,
without providing a rationale for the distinction.
are
reasonable
both
because
neither classification is invidious
attempts to take into account the character of public school
teachers. Neither burglars nor homosexuals merit suspect class
status, and neither burglary nor homosexual behavior merits
constitutional protection as a fundamental right. Therefore,
both classifications should be upheld as reasonable means of furthering the state's legitimate interest in employing men and
women of good character to serve as positive role models for students in government schools.59
homosexual practices.

MELISSA WELLS-PETRY,

EXCLUSION:

HOMOSEXUALS AND

(1993). She discovered that as a result of common
homosexual practices - such as anal sodomy, "fisting" (anal-fist contact), and
anilingus (oral-anal contact known as "rimming" in the homosexual
community) - homosexual males are at high risk of contracting AIDS,
hepatitis A, hepatitis B, anorectal venereal warts, and intestinal spirochetosis
among other infections. Id at 92-110. Physicians have even coined a term, the
"gay bowel syndrome," to aid in the diagnosis of anal infections and trauma
experienced by many homosexual men. Id at 107. David Richards' 1979
statement denying the immorality of homosexuality because "[t]here is no
convincing evidence that homosexuality is either harmful to the homosexual or
correlated with any form of mental or physical disease" seems completely
inoperative in light of the medical evidence to the contrary. David A.J.
Richards, Sexual Autonomy and the ConstitutionalRight to Privacy: A Case Study in
Human Rights and the Unwritten Constitution, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 957, 989 (1979).
55. See ELY, supra note 42, at 250 n.65.
56. Id,
57. Id. at 163, 255 n.92.
58. Professor Brest has the same difficulty with Ely's position: "If society
can express its fear or moral condemnation of burglars by forbidding them
certain jobs ... why can't it do likewise with respect to homosexuals?" Brest,
supra note 51, at 136. The distinction Ely makes is perhaps nothing more than
a product of his subjective views on the comparative merits of burglary and
homosexuality.
59. We also agree with Professor Sunstein's observation that "the
question whether a group deserves special solicitude under the Equal
Protection Clause depends on an inescapably normative inquiry into the
THE RIGHT TO SERVE
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Moreover, the Supreme Court's decision in Bowers v. Hardwick' weighs heavily against a claim of suspect class status for
homosexuals. Given that Hardwick held that the Constitution
allows states to enforce laws obviously intended to discourage
homosexuality, a decision that homosexuals deserve the status of
a traditionally suspect class is highly unlikely, short of direct
reversal of Hardwick.6 The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals has
made the import of Hardwick on the equal protection issue clear:
If the Court .[in Hardwick] was unwilling to object to state
laws that criminalize the behavior that defines the class, it
is hardly open to a lower court to conclude that state sponsored discrimination against the class is invidious. After
all, there can hardly be more palpable discrimination
against a class than making the conduct that defines the
class criminal.6 2
The lack of grounds for claiming suspect class status for
homosexuals was obvious to both the plaintiffs and the court in
Evans. The plaintiffs never raised a suspect class argument on
appeal,6 3 and the court only mentioned it in order to dismiss it.'
legitimacy of the reasons ordinarily used to disadvantage that group." Sunstein,
supra note 10, at 1177 n.79. Our disagreement with Professor Sunstein's
conclusion that "constitutional protection against discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation will ultimately take place under the Equal Protection Clause"
is the product of different traditions and different ways of understanding the
relationship between character and sexuality. Cf.Richard S. Myers, The Supreme
Court and the Privatization of Religion, 41 CAT. U. L. REV. 19, 73 (1991);
Sunstein, supra note 10, at 1179. A federal trial court recently concluded that
"sexual orientation, whether hetero-, homo- or bisexual, bears no relation
whatsoever to an individual's ability to perform, or to participate in, or
contribute to, society." Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of
Cincinnati, 860 F. Supp. 417, 437 (S.D. Ohio 1994). This court apparently
believes that so long as one has the physical or intellectual abilities to perform a
task, character is not a relevant factor. This is a repudiation of Dr. King's
statement of the basic principle of civil rights law, which in turn is perhaps the
reason why higher levels of judicial authority have held that homosexuals do
not qualify as a suspect or quasi-suspect class. See supra note 29.
60. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
61. Additionally, given the current Court's claims to defend its
institutional integrity by honoring the doctrine of stare decisis, presumably the
change in the Court's composition since Hardwick would have no more effect
on the"viability of Hardwick than say, that of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S.Ct. 2791 (1992).
62. Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 103 (D.C. Cir. 1989). See also High
Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 571 (9th Cir.
1990). Sodomy is a crime in 23 states. See supra note 1.
63. See Evans, 854 P.2d at 1275.
64. Id.
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RIGHTS AND CITIZEN INITIATIVES

FundamentalRights and Equal Protection

Given that homosexuals do not constitute a suspect class, the
Equal Protection Clause would otherwise command strict scrutiny only if Amendment Two created "inequalities bearing on
fundamental rights."65 The existence of such a right is a substantive matter requiring a "judicial determination that the text or
structure of the federal Constitution evidences a value that
should be*taken from the control of the political branches of government."6 6 Typically, a: determination that a fundamental right
exists depends upon whether the Court decides that a particular
right is "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,"6 7 or "fundamental to the American scheme of justice. " '
III.

EVANS' FORMULATION OF THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT

Remarkably, the Colorado Supreme Court made the curious
discoveries that constitutionalism (i.e. the idea of protecting individual liberties against democratically-enacted restrictions) is
unconstitutional and that our society's commitment to participatory democracy required the results of a voter initiative to
be set aside. In order to reach these peculiar 'results, the court
was required to stretch beyond recognition an important line of
equal protection cases decided by the Supreme Court of the
United States.
Initially, three groups of cases informed the court's
approach to Amendment Two - the right to vote cases, the
reapportionment cases, and the ballot access cases. Surveying
these cases, the court found a basis for a fundamental right
which would bring strict scrutiny to bear on Amendment Two.
The court noted that the Supreme Court has consistently
invalidated legislation which restricted the right to vote, such as
poll taxes and requirements that voters be civilians, own property, or have children, because these laws had the effect of "fencing out" certain classes of voters.6 9 Borrowing from the
65. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 16-7, at 1454
(2d ed. 1988). See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S.
432, 440 (1985).
1.66. Evans, 854 P.2d at 1290 (Erickson, J., dissenting). See also Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194-95 (1986); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1973) (fundamental rights must be "explicitly or
implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution").
67. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
68. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968). See Evans, 854 P.2d at
1291 (Erickson, J., dissenting).
69. Evans, 854 P.2d at 1277; Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 94 (1965).
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reasoning of Kramer v. Union Free School District7" that laws "granting the franchise to residents on a selective basis always pose the
danger of denying some citizens any effective voice in the governmental affairs which substantially affect their lives,"71 the Evans
majority leaped to the conclusion that "to the extent that legislation impairs a group's ability to effectively participate (which is not
to be confused with successful participation) in the process by
which government operates, close judicial scrutiny is
necessitated."7 2
Evans also discovered an interest in protecting political participation in the reapportionment cases. 7'3 The court found
these cases informative because they highlighted the Equal Protection Clause's protection of "participatory effectiveness, i.e., the
right to have one's vote be as meaningful as the votes of
others." 74 The Evans majority further observed that these cases
reflect the Supreme Court's judgment that
dilution in the effectiveness of certain voters' exercise of
the franchise violates the guarantee of equal protection of
the laws not simply because citizens are guaranteed the
right to vote, but because that right must be preserved in a
meaningful, effective manner. In short, equal protection
requires that voters are able to exercise the right of
75
franchise on an even footing with others.
Legislation which undermines one's vote - by diluting it in
these cases - interferes with this qualitative aspect of the right
to vote and thus deserves strict scrutiny.
Finally, the Evans court found a group of ballot access cases
to be informative. In these cases, the Supreme Court reviewed a
number of statutes, which regulated how parties or candidates
are placed on the ballot, to determine whether they denied voters equal protection. For example, in Williams v. Rhodes,76 the
Supreme Court considered a series of Ohio election laws which
"made it virtually impossible" for certain political parties to be
placed on the ballot in presidential elections. The Court held
that the restrictions violated the Equal Protection Clause because
70. 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
71. Id. at 626-27.
72. Evans, 854 P.2d at 1277 (emphasis added).
73. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Board of Estimate v.
Morris, 489 U.S. 688 (1989).
74. Evans, 854 P.2d at 1278.
75. Id. (citations omitted).
76. 393 U.S. 23, 24 (1968).
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they unjustifiably burdened the "fight of qualified voters, regardless of their political persuasion, to cast their votes effectively."77
Evans granted that the right to vote cases, the reapportionment cases, and the ballot access cases are "not dispositive of, or
directly controlling on, our decision here" and that they
"addressed entirely distinct questions and constitutional
problems from those presented" by Amendment Two. 78 Never-

theless, the court asserted that there was a "common thread"
between these cases and Amendment Two - "the principle that
laws may not create unequal burdens on identifiable groups with
"7
respect to the right to participate in the political process. 1
Under this analysis, the right to participate equally in the political process is a fundamental right which triggers strict scrutiny
under the Equal Protection Clause.8" "[T]hus, any attempt to
infringe on that right... can be held constitutionally valid only if
supported by a compelling state interest."81
A.

Amendment Two and the Right to Vote

Although the Colorado Supreme Court claims to have found
a "common thread" which connects the right-to-vote cases with
litigation seeking to nullify the popular adoption of initiatives
such as Amendment Two, its reasoning in Evans is unpersuasive
and seems little more than a fig leaf designed to cover the court's
results-oriented jurisprudence. The right-to-vote cases all relate
directly to the process of electing representatives. They involve
either direct restrictions on the right to vote - such as denial of
the franchise or of the right to cast a vote for the candidate of
one's choice - or dilution of the weight of one's vote through
the process of assigning voters to unequal districts. None of
these cases even remotely involves the issue in Evans - whether
groups of fully and equally empowered voters have a constitutional right to be free of constitutional restrictions on their substantive political agendas. In other words, the plaintiffs in Evans
seek not the vote, but the right to regulate the lives and property
of others free of constitutional limitations designed to protect
the liberties of those whom they seek to regulate.8 2
77.

Id. at 30. See Evans, 854 P.2d at 1278. The Evans dissent noted that

strict scrutiny no longer applies to ballot access cases. Id. at 1296 (Erickson,J.,
dissenting). See, e.g., Burdick v. Takushi, 112 S. Ct. 2059 (1992) (applying
balancing test); Anderson v. Celebreeze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983).
78. Evans, 854 P.2d at 1278.
79. Id. at 1279.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82.

See infra Section IV.

110

NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 9

The most elementary right-to-vote cases involved legislation
which required citizens to meet various prerequisites before they
were allowed to vote. The prerequisites might have included a
poll tax, a test on the substance of the Constitution, or even a
demonstration of property ownership. If a person failed to meet
these tests, they were denied the franchise. The Supreme Court
has consistently struck down these tests8 as
unconstitutional viola3
tions of the fundamental right to vote.
The reapportionment cases also involved factual issues
which are markedly different from the issues concerning Amendment Two. In the leading reapportionment case, Reynolds v.
Sims, 4 the Court was asked to review laws which diluted the force
of a person's vote. The reapportionment law at issue in Reynolds
organized legislative districts geographically such that the voting
districts in the state had widely disparate numbers of voters, even
though each district elected the same number of legislators.
The Court rejected these laws because they undermined the
"substantial equality" of the value of a person's vote with respect
to others in the same state. Reynolds stressed the practical goal of
this principle: "[T]he overriding objective must be substantial
equality of population among the various districts, so that the
vote of any citizen is approximately equal in weight to that of any
85
other citizen in the State."
Although the Court in Evans correctly analyzed the egalitarian purpose for rejecting the flawed reapportionment laws, it
failed to discern the context and focus of the decision in Reynolds. The Reynolds Court clearly stated that strict scrutiny is called
for because the unequal effects of reapportionment laws impinge
on a particular fundamental right, the right to vote:
[T]he Equal Protection Clause requires that the seats in
both houses of a bicameral state legislature must be apportioned on a population basis. Simply stated, an individual's
right to vote for state legislators is unconstitutionally
impaired when its weight is in a substantial fashion diluted
when compared
with votes of citizens living in other parts
86
of the State.
Finally, the ballot access cases also directly implicate the fundamental right to vote.8 7 For example, in Rhodes, Ohio election
83.
84.

See Evans, 854 P.2d at 1277.
377 U.S. 533 (1964).

85. Id. at 579.
86. Id. at 568.
87. It should be noted that while the ballot access cases are a species of
the fundamental right to vote, they are not equal to it. The Supreme Court has
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laws severely restricted access of new or small parties to the ballot. The Evans majority was correct to note that the effect of
these ballot access restrictions was to deny certain groups equal
access to the electoral process. Again, however, the equal protection challenge in Rhodes was grounded on a direct and elementary claim to political participation - the right to vote for the
candidates and parties of one's choice. The Rhodes Court applied
strict scrutiny because the Ohio laws imposed "substantially unequal burdens
on both the right to vote and the right to
88
associate."

In each of the voting rights cases relied upon by the court, in
Evans, the basis for strict scrutiny was the fact that these laws
impinged directly on the established .and fundamental right to
vote. In each case, the Supreme Court did not intimate reliance
on any right independent of the right to vote. None of these
cases invokes or implies the principle which controlled the
results in Evans - a vague right of political participation that
extends beyond the voting booth to invalidate constitutional limitations on substantive legislative agendas. To be sure, these cases
do demonstrate that the Court recognizes the importance of
equality in assuring citizens an equal vote for the candidates of
their choice. However, this is only to recognize that the equality
of participation interests discussed in Evans are best understood
as encapsulated in the right to vote. The court in Evans ignored
this context and improperly read the right-to-vote cases as supporting a seemingly unlimited right to have a political agenda
.insulated against the constitutional liberties of others.8 9
B. Exposition of the Right to Equal Participationin the Political
Process by the U.S. Supreme Court
The Evans court found the "most explicit, and nuanced,
articulation" of its new fundamental right in yet another category
of Supreme Court equal protection cases, a series of decisions in
which the Court reviewed "legislation which prevented the norfound that the ballot access right is not fundamental and deserves only
"heightened scrutiny," as opposed to "strict scrutiny." See Burdick v. Takushi,
112 S. Ct. 2059 (1992).
88. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 31 (1968). See also Illinois State Bd.
of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173 (1979).
89. The speculative nature of the enterprise of finding "fundamental
rights" is witnessed by the fact that whereas fundamental rights are rarely and
not lightly found by the Supreme Court, here both reviewing courts have
formulated two new, entirely different fundamental rights. The trial court
found the right to be "the right not to have the State endorse and give effect to
private biases." Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1274 (Colo. 1993) (en banc).

112

NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 9

mal political institutions and processes from enacting particular
legislation desired by an identifiable group of voters." 90 The
Evans majority relied most heavily on a leading equal protection
case, Hunter v. Erickson.9 In Hunter, the Court considered
whether an amendment to the Akron city charter violated the
Equal Protection Clause. The amendment prohibited the City
Council from implementing any ordinance dealing with racial,
religious, or ancestral discrimination in housing without the
approval of a majority of voters in a regular or general election.9 2
When Nellie Hunter, a black woman, attempted to buy a
house in Akron, Ohio, she met resistance from a real estate firm.
After preparing a list of houses for sale to show Mrs. Hunter, the
real estate agent refused to take Hunter to see the properties
when Hunter showed up for her appointment. The agent
explained that "all of the owners9 3had specified they did not wish
their houses shown to negroes."
Hunter sued seeking enforcement of an Akron ordinance
prohibiting racial discrimination in the housing market, and the
trial court held that the fair housing law was rendered unenforceable by the charter amendment described above. The Supreme
Court of Ohio affirmed and held that the charter amendment
did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed and held that
the Akron charter amendment "constitutes a real, substantial,
and invidious denial of the equal protection of the laws. 4
Although the Evans majority acknowledged that the charter
amendment in Hunter had been "aimed at minority racial
groups" and therefore was suspect under the Equal Protection
Clause, the court read Hunter to speak to "concerns which are
broader than the repugnancy of racial discrimination alone."9 5
Evans emphasized Justice White's connection of the Equal Protection Clause in Hunter with the protection of a person's funda90.
91.
92.

Id. at 1279.

93.

Id.

393 U.S. 385 (1969).
Id. at 387.

94. Id. at 393.
95. Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1279 (Colo. 1993) (en banc). The
classification in Hunterwas not a racial classification in the sense that it expressly
discriminated between whites and blacks or other racial or ethnic groups. Its
defect was that "the law's impact" disproportionately burdened racial and
ethnic minority groups. Hunter, 393 U.S. at 390-91. We believe this idea of
disparate impact on political participation by suspect (or quasi-suspect) groups
is the key to understanding the meaning - and the limits - of the Supreme
Court's political participation cases. See infra notes 112-41 and accompanying
text.
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mental right to vote: "Justice White ... concluded that Akron
could 'no more disadvantage any particulargroup by making it
more difficult to enact legislation in its behalf than it may dilute
any person's vote or give any group a smaller representation than
another of comparable size.' "96
Thus, the court in Evans read Hunterbroadly to suggest that
making it more difficult to enact legislation on one group's
behalf than another's is a violation of a fundamental right on a
par with the right to vote. Since all constitutional rights make it
"more difficult" for groups who favor unconstitutional legislation
to enact their political agendas, this broad reading of Hunter
appears to use constitutional law to invalidate the very concept of
constitutionalism - of majority rule tempered by the constitutional rights of individuals.
The Colorado Supreme Court found further support for this
new insight in its extraordinary reading of Washington v. Seattle
School District No. 1.9 7 In Washington, voters had passed a statewide referendum issue known as Initiative 350. Initiative 350
stipulated that no local school board could require any student
to attend a school other than the one located nearest or next
nearest to the child's residence. The initiative was facially neutral regarding race it applied irrespective of race but
included a large number of exceptions to the rule, which led the
Court to conclude that the initiative was enacted " '"because of"
not merely "in spite of" its adverse effects upon' busing for racial
integration."9"
In a remarkable example of revisionist jurisprudence, the
Evans court read Washington to support the extension of Hunter
outside the context of race-based discrimination. Evans noted.
that Washington had relied on a "neutral principles" formulation
from Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Hunter. The court's
take on this principle is that laws must meet the test of "neutrality" including not simply racial neutrality, but more generally,
politicalneutrality; Initiative 350 received strict scrutiny because it
was a type of political structure which "distorts governmental
processes in such a way as to place special burdens on the ability
of minority groups to achieve beneficial legislation."9 9 Evans
96. Evans, 854 P.2d at 1279 (quoting Hunter, 393 U.S. at 393 (emphasis
added)). The reference to "any particular group" in the quote from Hunter,
when read in context, clearly refers to any particular racial or ethnic minority
group. Clearly, the charter amendment in Hunter was invalidated because it
"discriminates against minorities." Hunter, 393 U.S. at 393.
97. 458 U.S. 457 (1982).
98. Id. at 471.
99. Evans, 854 P.2d at 1280 (quoting Washington, 458 U.S. at 467).
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asserted that Hunter and Washington envision an application of
the neutrality doctrine beyond matters of race." °
Thus, under the court's inspired reading of Hunt& and
Washington, it was not the racial character of the classifications
that required their invalidation in those cases. Rather, it was
their impact on the ability of any political group to participate in
the political process which made the laws suspect under the
Equal Protection Clause. The court's chimerical interpretation
of Hunter and Washington calls to mind Charles Fried's observation that "some arguments are so flawed that the only way to
present them is to wrap them up in fuzz and throw them over the
wall when no one is looking."' 1
The Evans majority next read Gordon v. Lance'

as having

"made clear" that the principle articulated in Hunter and Washington "is not one that can logically be limited to the 'race' context alone." 0 3 In Gordon, the Supreme Court addressed West
Virginia constitutional and statutory provisions which proscribed
the state's political subdivisions from incurring bonded indebtedness or raising taxes without the prior approval of 60% of the
voters in a referendum. The West Virginia Supreme Court had
ruled that these provisions unconstitutionally diluted the votesof
those who support revenue-producing measures by requiring
that they get more than 50% of the vote to win approval. The
U.S. Supreme Court distinguished Hunter'0 4 and reversed.
100. Evans, 854 P.2d at 1281. This analysis is not supported by any of the
judicial opinions on which it relies. The majority opinion in Hunter explicitly
stated that it was concerned with laws which place "special burdens on racial
minorities within the governmental process." Hunter,393 U.S. at 391. Justice
Harlan's concurring opinion found neutrality lacking only because the Akron
charter amendment "has the clear purpose of making it more difficult for
certain racial' and religious minorities to achieve legislation that is in their
interest." Id. at 395 (Harlan,J., concurring). The Court in Washington explicitly
and repeatedly stated that the equal protection principle it was enforcing
guaranteed "racial minorities the right to full participation in the political life
of the community." Washington, 458 U.S. at 467. See also id. at 467-70
(repeatedly stressing the "racial nature" of the law under review and its unique
burdens on "racial minorities.").
101. Charles Fried, Address at Brigham.Young University Law School
Graduation (April 22, 1988), discussed in James D. Gordon III, Law Review And
The Modern Mind, 33 ARiz. L. REv. 265, 269 (1991). Both Hunterand Washington
clearly and explicitly turn on the racial aspect of the challenged laws. See infra
notes 111-41 and accompanying text. The Colorado Supreme Court's analysis
in Evans is not supported by a fair reading of these cases.
102. 403 U.S. 1 (1971).
103. Evans, 854 P.2d at 1281.
104. Gordon, 403 U.S. at 5-6.
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, Evans discussed Gordon's treatment of Hunter at length. It
noted that Gordon distinguished Hunters applicability to the West
Virginia statutes because the bond restrictions in Gordon applied
equally to all public appropriations that would benefit from revenues; the charter at issue in Hunter, however, specifically
required a referendum only on fair housing legislation. Therefore, the Evans court concluded that the legislation invalidated in
Hunter restricted a specific group's political participation, while
that upheld in Gordon did not. Thus, the principle the Evans
court gleaned from its reading of Hunter and Gordon is that "no
sector of the population may be said to be 'fenced out' from the
franchise because of the way they will vote."" °5
Evans asserts that Gordon is clear evidence of the applicability
of Hunter's neutrality principle to political disputes beyond those
involving racial groups. If Hunter was only a "race" case, Evans
reasoned, then the court in Gordon could simply have dismissed
Hunteras irrelevant to the political dispute involved in Gordon.'°6
Thus, in the wake of its highly selective reading of Hunter
and Gordon, the Evans majority reasoned: "When taken together,
these facts clearly support the conclusion that Hunter applies to a
broad spectrum of discriminatory legislation."' 0 7 Given the
demands of "neutrality" under this reading of the case law, Evans
formulated its right:
We conclude that the Equal Protection Clause of the
United States Constitution protects the fundamental right
to participate equally in the political process, and that any
legislation or state constitutional amendment which
infringes on this right by 'fencing out' an independently
identifiable class of persons must be subject to strict judicial scrutiny.'0

Amendment Two, therefore, violates the political neutrality
demanded by this view of equal protection:
Amendment 2 alters the political process so that a targeted
class is prohibited from obtaining legislative, executive,
and judicial' protection or redress from discrimination
absent the consent of a majority of the electorate through
the adoption of a constitutional amendment. Rather than
attempting to withdraw antidiscrimination issues as a
whole from state and local control, Amendment 2 singles
105. Evans, 854 P.2d at 1282 (quoting Gordon, 403 U.S. at 5).
106. Evans, 854 P.2d at 1282.
107. Id.
108.

Id. (footnote omitted).
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out one form of discrimination and removes its redress
from consideration by the normal political processes1 ° 9
Thus, Amendment Two "must be subject to strict judicial scrutiny
in order to determine whether it is constitutionally valid under
the Equal Protection Clause." 1 ° Accordingly, the court
remanded the case to the trial court to determine whether
Amendment Two was supported by a compelling state interest as
required under strict scrutiny.
IV.

EvANs' ILLUSORY RIGHT

The potential scope of the right recognized by the Colorado
court in Evans is breathtaking. If the court means what it says, it
has discovered a constitutional right of any "independently identifiable class of persons" to have its political agenda insulated
against the constitutional rights of others.
The idea animating this remarkable new right is the truism
that constitutional law discourages political participation by
groups who favor unconstitutional legislation. For example,
gays, lesbians, and bisexuals were discouraged by Amendment
Two, because it made their desire to regulate the businesses and
properties of others - through restrictive "gay rights" laws more difficult to accomplish. Similarly, many Catholic and evangelical Christian parents are discouraged by the Establishment
Clause, because it prohibits the enactment of their political preferences for state-financed parochial schools. Pro-life groups,
members of which often share an "independently identifiable"
religious heritage, are discouraged by the unenumerated right of
privacy, by state Equal Rights Amendments, and by other provisions of state constititutions protecting reproductive rights,
because these provisions prohibit their strong preferences for
laws designed to protect human life in the womb. Crime victims
are discouraged from political participation by the Fourth, Fifth,
Sixth, and Eighth Amendments, and by their counterparts in
state constitutions, because these civil liberties invalidate laws
that violate the rights of criminal defendants.
109. Id. at 1285. The court further held that gays, lesbians, and bisexuals
are an "independently identifiable group" whose "ability to participate in the
political process" was restricted by Amendment Two. Id.
110.

Id. at 1286. On remand in Evans the trial court concluded that

Amendment Two was not necessary to support a compelling state interest and,
therefore, permanently enjoined its enforcement. The Colorado Supreme
Court affirmed this ruling in Evans IL Evans v. Romer, Nos. 94SA48, 94SA128,
1994 Colo. LEXIS 779 at *43-*44 (Colo. Oct. 11, 1994).
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The list is endless. Constitutional law routinely discourages
groups from seeking to legislate political agendas which violate
the constitutional rights of others. Indeed, one of the purposes
of constitutional law undoubtedly is to insulate persons whose
rights are protected by the Constitution against political agendas
designed to restrict those rights. The Evans court has turned the
Constitution against itself by inventing a constitutional right not
to be discouraged from political participation by the existence of
constitutional law. Under this bizarre reading of the Constitution, civil liberties are viewed as some kind of virus and the Equal
Protection Clause becomes a vaccine which immunizes the legislative programs of all "independently identifiable groups" against
the constitutional rights of others.
Clearly, the Constitution does not provide protection for any
and every such group against the political discouragement that
necessarily arises when a group seeks to enact laws which restrict
the constitutional liberties of others. More plausibly, the Evans
court stretched Hunter and its progeny beyond recognition in
order to protect not all "identifiable groups," but rather one,
"non-suspect" group in particular. As a result, the people of Colorado were denied the right to advance their civil liberties by
amending the state constitution to protect themselves against
attempts to legislate the restrictions and prohibitions of homosexual rights laws.
The Evans court acknowledged that the right to vote cases,
the reapportionment cases, and the ballot access cases do not
support the startling new right employed by the court to bring
strict scrutiny to bear on Amendment Two. As noted above, the
court's rationale turns primarily on an expansive reading of
Hunter and its progeny to protect the political participation of
identifiable groups. Thus, the accuracy of Evans' reading of the
Hunter line of decisions is critically important for the viability of
the Evans right.
A careful reading of those cases, however, demonstrates that
the reasoning of the Colorado Supreme Court in Evans was seriously flawed, if not incoherent. Hunter and its progeny are not
about an Equal Protection Clause at war with other constitutional
liberties. Rather, these decisions recognize an important principle within clear and reasonable parameters. Their analyses are
inextricably intertwined with the central meaning of equal protection - the protection of racial minorities and similar "suspect" classes against laws which place "unusual burdens" upon
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them. 1 The rule of these cases can be stated as follows: Laws
that interfere with the right of racial and other suspect classes to
participate in the political process are subject to strict scrutiny
even if the laws are facially neutral.
A. Hunter and its Progeny as Suspect Class Cases
It is central to the rationale of the Evans court that Hunter
and its progeny are not suspect classification cases.1 12 After all, if
the charter amendment in Hunter had been struck down on the
grounds that it used an improper suspect classification, then
Hunterwould be a weak foundation upon which to build a radical
new right of political participation for non-suspect (but identifiable) classes. Unfortunately for the Colorado Supreme Court
and its champions among the opponents of Amendment Two, a
careful reading of Hunter makes clear that it is a race case and
nothing more.
As noted above, Hunter struck down a city charter amendment which required local ordinances dealing with racial, religious, or ancestral discrimination in housing to be approved by a
majority of the city's voters at a general election. 1 The racially
discriminatory impact of the amendment to Akron's city charter
was crucial to the Court's rationale in Hunter.
The reason Hunter was not an "easy" suspect class case is
because the charter amendment was facially neutral, i.e. it did
not explicitly discriminate among different racial groups."1 4
Therefore, the case ran headlong into the principle that faciallyneutral classifications are not suspect absent proof of "a racially
discriminatory purpose. " "' Under this rule, a formally neutral
classification will be upheld - even if it has a racially disproportionate impact - unless "from the totality of the relevant facts" a
111. Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 486
(1982). See also Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 391-92 (1969) ("[b]ecause the
core of the Fourteenth Amendment is the prevention of meaningful and
unjustified official distinctions based on race. .. racial classifications are
'constitutionally suspect' ") (emphasis added).
112. Evans, 854 P.2d at 1282 (denying that Hunteris "nothing more" than
a racial classification case).
113. Hunter, 393 U.S. at 386.
114. Id.at 390. The Evans court cited Hunter's complexity as proof that it
could not possibly be a race case "and nothing more." Evans, 854 P.2d at 1282.
115. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976). Hunter, which was
decided several years before the discriminatory purpose requirement had been
clearly established by the Court, anticipated this development in the law. See
Cass R. Sunstein, Public Values, Private Interests, and the Equal Protection Clause,
1982 Sup. CT. REV. 127, 147.
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purpose to discriminate, on the basis of race or a similar suspect
characteristic, is established.11 6
The reason Hunterwas difficult was not, as the court in Evans
suggests," 7 because it was crafting a sophisticated new right of
political participation for any and every identifiable group.
Rather, Hunter was hard because the Court needed to explain
how the facially-neutral classification constituted a "meaningful
and unjustified official distinction[ ] based on race."118 In other
words, the Court's work in Hunterwas to point out that, despite
its surface neutrality, the charter amendment placed "special
burdens on racial minorities"concerning their ability to enact legislation prohibiting racial discrimination in housing." 9
Hunter's progeny further supports this analysis. For example, although in Washington Initiative 350 did not explicitly discriminate on the basis of race, it made it more difficult for racial
minorities to enact legislation designed to integrate public
schools. 2 ° The Court held that the initiative created a highly
suspect racial classification because it "remove [d] the authority to
address a racialproblem - and only a racial problem - from
the existing decisionmaking body, in such a way as to burden
minority interests."' 2 ' The Supreme Court carefully discussed
the meaning of Hunter and explained why legislation of the kind
challenged in that case "falls into an inherently suspect
category:"
[W] hen the political process or the decisionmaking mechanism used to address racially conscious legislation - and
only such legislation - is singled out for peculiar and.dis116. Id. at 242. See also Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-68 (1977).
117. Evans, 854 P.2d at 1282:
"If... Hunter is a 'race' case and nothing more, the Supreme Court
could have summarily dismissed the notion that it was applicable in
Gordon. The fact that the Court did not do so, however, strongly
suggests that the holding of Hunter cannot be limited in application
only to the review of legislation which discriminates on the basis of
race."
This uncommonly trivial argument overlooks the fact that Hunter does not
cease to be a "race" case simply because it is not an easy case. As any fair and
competent reading of the decision will show, Hunter is a complex and difficult
racial classification case. See Hunter,393 U.S. at 390-92.
118. Hunter, 393 U.S. at 391.
119. Id. at 391 (emphasis added).
120. Washington v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982).
121. Id. at 474 (emphasis added). The Court repeatedly emphasized that
what it found objectionable about Initiative 350 was "the racial natureof the way
in which it structures the process of decisionmaking." Id. at 480 n. 23 (alteration
in the original).
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advantageous treatment, the governmental action plainly
"rests on 'distinctions based on race.' "122
There is simply no way to read Hunterand Washington as standing
for any proposition broader than the one just quoted. Both cases
involved the Court's efforts to implement the principle lying at
the core of equal protection - "the prevention of123meaningful
and unjustified official distinctions based on race."
As Justice Erickson's thoughtful dissent in Evans makes
clear, the majority's reading of Hunter as the source of a broad
right of political participation for "identifiable groups" was
expressly discussed and rejected by the Supreme Court in James
v. Valtierra.124 James upheld the constitutionality of a California
constitutional amendment which provided that no "low rent
housing project" could be undertaken by "any state public body"
until the project was1 25approved by a majority of the voters at a
community election.
Thus, as in Evans, the California amendment made it more
difficult for an identifiable group (the poor) to enact part of its
legislative agenda through the normal political process. Appellees in James, a number of low income residents of California,
made this exact argument to the Court.1 26 And the Court explicitly rejected this attack on California's "procedure for democratic
decisionmaking." 127 Justice Black's majority opinion was both
succinct and persuasive:
But of course a lawmaking procedure that "disadvantages"
a particular group does not always deny equal protection.
Under any such holding, presumably a State would not be
able to require referendums on any subject unless referenall, because they would always disdums were required on1 28
advantage some group.
Since the Court read Hunter as a case involving political burdens
on racial minorities, 1" and since the poor are not a suspect class
122. Id. at 485-86 (quoting James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 141 (1971)
and Hunter, 393 U.S. 385 at 391).
123. Id. at 486 (quoting Hunter, 393 U.S. 385 at 391).
124. 402 U.S. 137 (1971). See Evans, 854 P.2d at 1297-99 (Erickson, J.,
dissenting).
125. James, 402 U.S. at 139 n.2.
126. They argued that the California amendment constituted
"unconstitutional discrimination because it hampers persons desiring public
housing from achieving their objective when no such roadblock faces other
groups seeking to influence other public decisions to their advantage." Id at
142.
127. Id. at 143.
128. Id at 142.
129. Id. at 140-41.
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under the Equal Protection Clause, the Court held that the California amendment could be invalidated "only by extending
Hunter, and this we decline to do."" s The Evans court made no
serious attempt to distinguish James as relevant to the validity of
Amendment Two under the Equal Protection Clause. 3 ' James is
a strong precedent for upholding Amendment Two and similar
popular initiatives which "give citizens a voice on questions of
public policy."'3 2
Likewise, the court's attempt in Evans to read Gordon as support for an extremely far-reaching right of political participation
fails to persuade. 3 3 In Gordon, the Supreme Court upheld a
West Virginia law that proscribed the state's political subdivisions
from incurring bonded indebtedness or raising taxes without the
prior approval of 60% of the voters in a referendum. The Court
held that unlike the facts of Hunter and other previous cases, the
West Virginia law did not single out any "discrete and insular
minority" for special burdens.'3
Therefore, it concluded that
"so long as such provisions do not discriminate against or authorize discrimination against any identifiable class they do not violate the Equal Protection Clause." 3 5
The Evans majority argues that since the West Virginia laws
upheld in Gordon "had nothing to do with racial minorities or any
other traditionally suspect class, yet the Court felt compelled to
discuss Hunter," it is clear that the principle in Hunter "applies to
a broad spectrum of discriminatory legislation." 1 6 This assertion
-

it can not seriously be called legal reasoning -

is unpersua-

sive. The Supreme Court in Gordon did precisely what Evans said
130. I&at 141. Even the dissent in James agreed that this was the proper
analysis. They differed with the majority only in their belief that classification
on the basis of poverty should be treated as suspect under the Equal Protection
Clause. Id.at 144-45 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
131. The court dismissed James as being "best understood as a case
declining to apply suspect class status to the poor, and not as a limitation on
Hunter." Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1282 n.21 (Colo. 1993) (en banc). This
is simply not a fair reading of the case, because it is clear that the James Court
rejected the argument that the California amendment made it more difficult
for an identifiable group (the poor) to enact part of its legislative agenda
through the normal political process. See supra notes 124-28 and accompanying
text.
132. James, 402 U.S. at 141.
133. Evans, 854 P.2d at 1281-82.
134. Gordon v. Lance, 403 U.S. 1, 5 (1970).
135. Id. at 7.
136. Evans, 854 P.2d at 1282. The court attempted to bolster this
specious reasoning by adding the following trivial insight: "If. . . Hunter is a
'race' case and nothing more, the Supreme Court could have summarily
dismissed the notion that it was applicable in Gordon." I&
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it did not do - it discussed Hunter only to distinguish it as a case
involving legislation which singled out racial minorities and
other suspect classes for unfavorable treatment."3 7 Although the
West Virginia laws made it more difficult for some political
groups to enact their legislative agendas, they did not discriminate against any racial or other suspect class and, therefore, did
not violate the Equal Protection Clause.'
Thus, Gordon is an
application - not a repudiation - of the "race only" reading of
Hunter.
Taken one by one or together, Hunter, Washington, James,
and Gordon do not support a broad right for any and every identifiable group to have its political agenda insulated against the civil
liberties of others. Rather, these cases recognize that the central
purpose of the Equal Protection Clause is to protect racial and
other suspect classes against discriminatory state action. Therefore, laws that interfere with the right of racial and ethnic minorities to participate in the political process are subject to strict
scrutiny even if the laws are facially neutral."3 9 However, laws
that make it more difficult for non-suspect groups to enact their
political agendas, such as the laws upheld in James and Gordon, do
not conflict with the Supreme Court's understanding of equal
protection." 4 Since Amendment Two falls into the latter' category, the court in Evans should
have upheld Amendment Two
41
under a rational basis test.'

137. Gordon, 403 U.S. at 5.
138. Id. at 5-7. The Court expressly stated that although West Virginia
"has indeed made it more difficult" for supporters of tax increases and bond
issues to succeed, "there is nothing in the language of the Constitution, our
history, or our cases that requires that a majority always prevail on every issue."
Id. at 5, 6.
139. See Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 467-70
(1982); Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 390-93 (1969). These cases do not
create a fundamental right.of political participation. They merely hold that a
classification that restricts the ability of a suspect class to participate in the
political process is a suspect classification notwithstanding its facial neutrality.
140. James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 141-43 (1971); Gordon,403 U.S. at 57.
141. Amendment Two clearly serves the rational and legitimate
governmental purpose of protecting the religious freedom, freedom of
conscience, and property rights of the employers, landlords, and other persons
protected by the amendment. In fact, the basic civil liberties protected by
Amendment Two at least arguably provide a compelling justification for
governmental action. For a discussion of these issues, see infa notes 165-79 and
accompanying text.
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B.

Suspect Classes or Identifiable Classes?

Regardless of the merits of the analysis in Evans of the
Hunter line of cases, should a broad right of political participation be recognized for any "identifiable class of persons?" Or
should the line remain where the Supreme Court has drawn it at the point of suspect classes?
Clearly, the Supreme Court has made a wise choice by going
this far and no further. In a society such as ours which places a
high value on freedom, the judiciary should be very reluctant to
recognize a right of any identifiable group to have its regulatory
agenda protected against the civil liberties of others. Although
Evans did not define the concept of an "independently identifi-;
able group," ' 42 it did conclude that it was broad enough to cover

non-suspect classes such as homosexuals and bisexuals.1 4 Moreover, while denying that it was opening the constitutional floodgates for groups wishing to use the political process to enact laws
restricting the civil liberties of others, the court supplied no limiting principle to contain its right of political participation."'
Are supporters of state-financed parochial schools, pro-life
groups, and crime victims groups "independently identifiable
classes" for purposes of the right of political participation? If
not, Why are they out and homosexuals in? If so, then the time
has come to throw out much of state and federal constitutional
law, because many such identifiable groups routinely are flouted
in the political process by the state and federal constitutional
142. Evans, 854 P.2d at 1282-86.
143. Id. at 1285.
144. .Id at 1283-86. The authors of a leading constitutional law casebook
point out that even the Ku Klux Klan might be an "identifiable group" whose
political agenda is protected under Evans.
The Constitution itself places a number of political issues
"beyond" the political process - like racial bigotry (the
Reconstruction Amendments) and the establishment of a state
religion (the First Amendment). 4Identifiable" groups, such as
the Ku Klux Klan and certain religious groups (like the Anglicans,
who have the "state church" in England) are precluded from
using the normal political processes to obtain goals that may be
important to them.
DANIEL A. FARBER, WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., & PHILIP P. Fiucxxv, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON CONSTIruTIONAL LAw 72-73 (Supp. 1994). Does the Evans

principle extend to protect the political agenda of the KKK against the state or
federal constitutional rights of racial and religious minorities? If not, then the
Colorado court will need a theory to explain "why restricting the KKK's political
participation is less defensible than restricting that of gays and lesbians." Id at

73.
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rights of others. 145 That's how constitutional law works, and it is
this idea that seems to confuse the Evans court. In short, Evans is
wrong because constitutionalism is not unconstitutional. If
homosexuals and bisexuals (and perhaps other sexual-behavior
groups who have yet to form a liberation movement) are to be
insulated against popular civil liberties initiatives like Amendment Two, it should come only after they have convinced the
Supreme Court to include them as a suspect class. Basic freedoms are too important to have to yield whenever liberty intersects with the regulatory agenda of any identifiable special
interest.
V.

GRASSROOTS INITIATIVES AND EQUAL CITIZENSHIP: WHO IS
STIGMATIZING WHOM?

Professor Kenneth Karst has argued that Amendment Two
and similar grassroots initiatives are constitutionally suspect
because they clash with the principle of "equal citizenship."" 4
145. This point was discussed at length in the introductory paragraphs of
Section IV. In the Cincinnati case, a federal trial court attempted to distinguish
between "independently identifiable groups" and mere "identifiable groups."
The court said that "the difference between an 'independently identifiable
group' and an 'identifiable group' is that where the factor identifying the group
transcends the mere support for any given issue, the group is 'independently
identifiable.'" Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati,
860 F. Supp. 417, 434 n.12 (S.D. Ohio 1994). "On the other hand, a group
whose sole identifying characteristic is that group's support for a single issue is
merely an identifiable group." Id. Under this definition, most "identifiable
groups" are also "independently identifiable groups." Just as gays and lesbians
share an inclination to engage in same-sex relationships, the groups in our
hypotheticals all share experiences, relationships, and beliefs which transcend
any single political issue. For example, the supporters of state-financing for
parochial schools share a common culture dating back several thousand years, a
Biblical world view, and a deep religious commitment. Similarly, many
(perhaps most) pro-life groups, such as Lutherans For Life, the Christian
Coalition, and organized groups of traditional Roman Catholics, are composed
of individuals who share characteristics which transcend the politics of
abortion. Finally, members of crime victims groups share the pain, humiliation,
and frustration of having been traumatized first by a criminal perpetrator and
then by a criminal justice system which often seems more concerned with
criminals than with justice. Any generally applicable definition of
"independently identifiable group" that is broad enough to include
homosexuals and bisexuals will almost certainly include many other groups
whose policy preferences have been placed beyond the ordinary political
process by the federal and state constitutional rights of individuals. See supra
note 144.
146. KENNETH L. KARST, LAW'S PROMISE, LAw's ExPREssION: VISIONS OF
POWER IN THE PoLrncs OF RACE, GENDER, AND REUGION 182 (1993) [hereinafter

KRs-r, LAW's PROMISE]. Karst describes the principle of equal citizenship as
follows:
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Without a doubt, the idea of equality of citizenship lies at the
core of the Fourteenth Amendment; however, contrary to Karst,
initiatives such as Amendment Two serve to advance - not
inhibit - the ability of all groups to participate in our diverse
and pluralistic society free of government-imposed stigma and
discouragement.
According to Karst, the problem with Amendment Two is
what he calls its "expressive effects." 147 He argues it stigmatizes
homosexuals by "formally declaring the separation of a group of
people from the community of citizens who are worthy of governmental protection against discrimination." 48 In other words, by
constitutionalizing the right "to discriminate against citizens on
the basis of their sexual orientation"1 49 the citizens of Colorado
have "pronounce [d] an official anathema on homosexual orientation."5 ° Moreover, Karst fears that the initiative has somehow
legitimized "antigay" attitudes and behaviors, given citizens "perEach individual is presumptively entitled to be treated by the
organized society as a respected, responsible, and participating
member. Stated negatively, the principle forbids the organized
society to treat an individual as a member of an inferior or
dependent caste or as a nonparticipant. The principle thus
centers on those aspects of equality that are most closely bound to
the sense of self and the sense of inclusion in a community.
KENNETH L. KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA: EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AND THE CONsTrtrrIoN 3 (1989) [hereinafter KARST, "BELONGING TO AMERICA"]. In other
words, government should refrain from harming "the equal citizenship values
of respect, participation, and responsibility." KARST, LAW'S PROMISE, supra, at
177.
147. KARST, LAW'S PROMISE, supra note 146, at 183.
148. Id at 185.
149. Id at 184. Professor Karst argues that under Reitman v. Mulkey, 387
U.S. 369 (1967), an initiative violates the Equal Protection Clause if it creates a
state constitutional right to discriminate. KARST, LAw's PROMISE, supra note 146,
at 183. In Reitman, the Court struck down an initiative which effectively
repealed state and local fair housing laws and embodied a broad right to
discriminate, "including the right to discriminate on racial grounds," in the
California constitution. 387 U.S. at 377. The Court held that the initiative
"would involve the State in private racial discrimination to an unconstitutional
degree." Id. at 378-79 (emphasis added). In effect, Reitman stands for the
proposition that a state may not encourage others to discriminate "on grounds
which admittedly would be unavailable under the Fourteenth Amendment
should state action be involved." Id. at 374. The rationale of the Court in
Reitman does not apply to citizen initiatives, like Amendment Two, which do not
apply to suspect or quasi-suspect classes such as race, ethnicity, or gender.
Discrimination on the basis of morally-significant behavior, such as
homosexuality, is completely unlike the irrational and invidious racial
discrimination that was struck down in Reitman. For a discussion of suspect
classes and Amendment Two, see supra notes 29-64 and accompanying text.
150. KARST, LAw's PROMISE, supra note 146, at 185.
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mission to hate," and may have encouraged "insults" and even
"physical attacks" directed at homosexuals."' 1
Careful analysis of Amendment Two and its context, however, demonstrates that its effect is exactly the opposite of what
Karst asserts. It is gay rights legislation which stigmatizes,
marginalizes, and fences out identifiable groups of individuals,
and Amendment Two serves to remove this stigma and its associated harms and restores government to a position of benign
neutrality.
An important purpose and effect of the gay political agenda
is to stigmatize, marginalize, and silence religious traditionalists,'5 2 and to fence them out from authentic participation in the
economic and social life of the community.' 5" Consider the
151. Id at 186. Amazingly, Karst even goes so far as to compare
Amendment Two to the infamous Jim Crow laws which once mandated racial
separation in Southern states. Karst's cynical attempt to demonize the citizens
of Colorado who supported Amendment Two as gay-bashers and haters calls to
mind Marshall Kirk and Hunter Madsen's self-proclaimed "gay manifesto for
the 1990's." MARsHALL KIRK & HuNTER MADSEN, AvrER THE BALL (1989). Kirk
and Madsen propose a campaign of "unabashed propaganda" to advance gay
rights, one aspect of which includes demonizing those who believe homosexual
behavior is sinful or immoral by comparing them to Klansmen, Nazis, and
similar racists "whose associated traits and attitudes appall and anger Middle
America." Id at 189. By stooping to employ the techniques of homosexual
rights fundamentalists, Karst detracts from an otherwise thoughtful (if seriously
mistaken) analysis.
152. Religious traditionalists are, of course, not the only ones who believe
homosexual behavior is unethical. Gay rights laws also harm the secular
counterparts of religious traditionalists, persons whose traditional beliefs about
human sexuality are based upon non-religious ethical principles. For the sake
of convenience, we will use the term "traditional believers" to refer collectively
to religious and secular traditionalists.
153. A primary goal of the gay agenda is to target those who believe
homosexual behavior is sinful or immoral, and portray these individuals and
their beliefs as shameful and discreditable. Consider the public relations
strategy for gay rights suggested by Kirk and Madsen:
The best way to make homohatred look bad is to vilify those who
victimize gays. The public should be shown images of ranting
homohaters whose associated traits and attitudes appall and anger
Middle America. The images might include:
" Klansmen demanding that gays be slaughtered or castrated;
" Hysterical backwoods preachers, drooling with hate to a
degree that looks both comical and deranged;
* Menacing punks, thugs, and convicts who speak coolly about
the "fags" they have bashed or would like to bash;
* A tour of Nazi concentration camps where homosexuals were
tortured and gassed.
KIRK & MADSEN, supra note 151, at 189. It is important to recognize that when
Kirk and Madsen speak of "homohaters" by their own admission they are referring not to the fringes of society but to "30-35% of the citizenry." Id. at 175.
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effect of legislation prohibiting employment and housing discrimination on the ability of traditional believers to govern their
businesses in accordance with their most profound and deeply
held principles and beliefs.
Take the hypothetical case of Margaret McCabe, an elderly
woman who was recently widowed and is supporting herself on
Social Security and a little income generated by a five-plex apartment building she owns and manages. As a devout Roman Catholic, Mrs. McCabe believes that fornication and homosexual
behavior are serious sins and that it is sinful for her to facilitate
others who wish to commit these sins. She also wishes to maintain a "family atmosphere" in the building for her tenants. What
is the effect on Mrs. McCabe's claim to equal citizenship when
her home state enacts legislation prohibiting employment and
housing discrimination on the basis of sexual practice or preference?"' How is her citizenship affected when an initiative similar to Amendment Two is adopted?
Moreover, there is an anti-religious slant to this hateful campaign, because Kirk
and Madsen believe that most of the targeted "homohaters" are God's army of
bigots. I& at xv ("These days, America rebukes all bigotry, except that which it
imagines is God's."). These stigmatizing tactics were recently directed at an
eminent scholar who had accepted an invitation to speak at Harvard Law
School. When Oxford Professor John Finnis spoke at Harvard on April 19,
1994, his speech was rudely interrupted by protestors, he was called a "hatemonger" and a "homophobe", and his invitation to speak at Harvard was compared to inviting the Grand Wizard of the KKK to lecture at that august citadel
of higher education. A commentary written by a Harvard law student for the
school's newspaper could have been written by Kirk and Madsen (but not, we
hope, by Professor Karst):
They [the Harvard community] passively allow homophobia to have a
legitimate forum in which to spread its hateful, violent message that
homosexuals are moral perverts whom society must suppress. But
homophobia's message is not simply an alternative point of view; it is
every bit as repugnant and dangerous as the view that all blacks are
dumb and lazy or that the Holocaust is the creation of a Jewish- conspiracy. Indeed, like anti-Semitism and racism, homophobia has a
body count.
Scott Wiener, Homophobia Cannot Be Tolrated, HARvARD LAw REcoRD, Apr. 29,
1994, at 11. John Finnis is a distinguished scholar who has published many
important works on the relationship between law and morality. See, e.g. MoRAL
ABSOLurEs: TRADITION, REVISION, AND TRUTH (1991); NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (1989); FUNDAMENTALS OF ETHics (1983). That one of the world's
leading authorities on natural law should be treated this way at Harvard University because of his views on sexual morality speaks volumes about the intolerance and fervor of the gay rights movement.
154. Duncan, supra note 7, at 395. See, e.g., Attorney General v. Desilets,
636 N.E.2d 233 (Mass. 1994); Donahue v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n,
2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 32 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991), review dismissed and cause remanded, 859
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To use Karst's terminology, traditional believers like Mrs.
McCabe have been harmed severely by the "stigmatizing expression" of the homosexual rights law. 155 This law, enacted under
the banner of tolerance, declares Mrs. McCabe - and her religion - homophobic, wrong, and immoral."5 6 It forces her to
choose between her deeply held (and widely shared) ethical
beliefs and the right to participate in the economic life of the
community. Under this law, the price of authenticity for Mrs.
McCabe -

of being herself and obeying her God -

is govern-

mentally-mandated separation from': the rest of the citizenry.1 5 7
She may not be both an authentic believer and a landlord. 58

P.2d 671 (Cal. 1993). See also STEPHEN L. CAm, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF
136-45 (1993).
155. See KARST, LAw's PROMISE, supra note 146, at 185. The Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts has recognized that nonconformity with fair
housing laws prohibiting discrimination against unmarried cohabitants "may
stigmatize the defendants in the eyes of many and thus burden the exercise of
the defendants' religion." Desilets, 636 N.E.2d at 237-38.
156. Professor Karst has described eloquently the harms inflicted by
stigmatizing laws:
Stigma - especially stigma propagated by government -produces

harms that are both immediate and consequential. The immediate
harms are psychic:

insult, humiliation, indignity for the people

stigmatized.

supra note 146, at 185-86.
157. If the concept of equal citizenship is "most closely bound to the
sense of self and the sense of inclusion in a community," homosexual rights
laws strike at the heart of Mrs. McCabe's claim under the principle. See KARsr,
BELONGING To AMERICA, supra note 146, at 3.
158. KAusr, LAW's PROMISE, supra note 146, at 185-86. We will resist the
temptation to echo Professor Karst and assert that gay rights laws give
"permission to hate" traditional believers like Mrs. McCabe. Id. at 186. See supra
note 153. For a compelling account of a pastor of a small church in San
Francisco who became the target of anti-Christian violence and hatred when he
challenged a local gay rights ordinance, see CHUCK MCILHENNEY ET AL., WHEN
THE WICKED SEIZE A CrY (1993). This hatred of traditional religion is not
confined to the fringes of the homosexual community. It is ubiquitous in gay
literature. Consider, for example, an essay about Roman Catholic clergy
published earlier this year by Paul Monette, an openly gay intellectual whose
work has won a National Bbok Award and three Lambda Literary Awards. In an
essay entitled My Priests,Monette frequently vents his hatred and rage about the
Catholic Church and its leadership. He refers to "the Axis powers in Rome",
"the Vatican Nazis" and "the Polish Pope and his diabolical sidekick, Cardinal
Ratzinger, the Vatican's Minister of Hate." PAUL MONETrE, LAST WATCH OF THE
NIGHT: EssAYS Too PERSONAL AND OTHERWISE 55 (1994). He describes the
Church's teaching about human sexuality as "only for making babies, starving
ones ideally, because they make better copy and bring in more gold to Rome."
I. at 64. See also PAUL MoNET-m, BECOMING A MAN: HALF A LIFE STORY 2
(1992) (referring to "the Nazi Popes and all their brocaded minions, the ratbrain politicians, the wacko fundamentalists and their Book of Lies"). Monette,
who is dying of AIDS, has directed his rage at religious institutions whose
KARST, LAW's PROMISE,
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The same is true of gay rights legislation governing employment. For example, the owner of a Christian bookstore might
reasonably decide that it is inappropriate to employ a practicing
and unrepentant homosexual to work as a clerk in his business. I" 9 The employer might wish to take character into account
when hiring persons whose responsibilities include recommending Bibles, devotionals, and hymnals to customers. Under
the gay rights law, the Christian employer is branded an outlaw
by the state and forced to choose between his religious conscience and his business. 16°
Clearly, homosexual rights legislation violates the principle
of equal citizenship, because it constitutes "a legislative determination to use the law's coercion as a means of establishing a
social definition [of traditional believers] that is itself incapacitating. " ' 61 To participate equally in society, these believers must
deny an important part of their identity. The law requires them
to be untrue to who they are and what they believe. 6 2
Viewed against this background, the effect of Amendment
Two and similar grassroots initiatives is not to stigmatize and
harm homosexuals, but rather to remove the stigma and associated harms inflicted on traditional believers by state and local
homosexual rights legislation. Contrary to Karst's arguments,
these initiatives do not separate homosexuals from the rest of the
community. Citizens remain free to hire or rent apartments to
persons of all sexual persuasions. Homosexuality is not declared
unlawful or immoral. The only effect of these initiatives is to provide that political majorities may not enact legislation that fences
out traditional believers. In other words, the initiatives take a
neutral position on the ethics of human sexuality. Both traditional believers and sexual revolutionists (and everyone in
teachings about sexuality, if practiced, almost certainly would have protected
our society against this deadly disease.
159. See Duncan, supranote 7, at 395. This is not to say that all traditional
believers would make the same employment decision in this case. Others might
see the employment relationship as an opportunity to reach a lost soul and lead
him or her to repentance and saving grace. Still others might conclude that
their employees' sexual lifestyles are irrelevant. The question here is whether
government should use its coercive and expressive powers to stigmatize and
forbid one or more of these religiously-motivated choices.
160. In other words, homosexual rights laws are to traditional believers as
sodomy laws are to homosexuals.
161. See KARsr, LAw's PROMISE, supra note 146, at 182.
162. And in the case of religious traditionalists, homosexual rights laws
sometimes require them to engage in conduct that violates their understanding
of what pleases God. For a discussion of the conflict between homosexual
rights laws and the free exercise of religion, see Duncan, supra note 7, at 416-

45.
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between) are free to live authentic lives in a pluralistic
community.
Traditional believers are not "bigots," or "gay-bashers," or
"homophobes." They are rational, reasonable, and compassionate human beings. For the most part, they sincerely believe that
adherence to moral absolutes, to God's plan of moral action, is
"the ideal of integral human fulfillment."1 6 3 They "have
accepted that to respect the moral limits proposed by the creator
as implicit in his creative wisdom is, therefore, supremely intelligent and reasonable - is to do all that in this life we can do
towards enhancing good and lessening evil, on the whole and in
the long run." " These people deserve better than the stigmatizing and. harmful treatment they get from government when it
enacts homosexual rights legislation. They deserve the equal citizenship that is bestowed upon them by citizen initiatives such as
Amendment Two.

VI.

THE STATE INTERESTS SERVED BY INITIATIVES LiKE
AMENDMENT

Two

Since citizen initiatives like Amendment Two contain no suspect classification and infringe no fundamental right, they are
entitled to a strong presumption of validity and should be sustained so long as their rovisions are "rationally related to a legitimate state interest. 1 5 In other words, any equal protection
challenge against Amendment Two must fail unless the challengers overcome the presumption of validity by establishing that the
amendment is completely irrational." 6
Some commentators have argued that initiatives like
Amendment Two serve no rational basis.' 6 7 None of these crit163.

JOHN FINNIS, MoRAL ABSOLUTES:

TRADITON, REVISION, AND TRUTH

106 (1991).
164. Id.
165. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440
(1985). "When social or economic legislation is at issue, the Equal Protection
Clause allows the States wide latitude." Id.
166. "[T]he Equal Protection Clause requires only a rational means to
serve a legitimate end." I& at 442. As the Supreme Court clearly stated in
F.C.C. v. Beach Communications, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2096, 2101 (1993): "In areas
of social and economic policy, a statutory classification that neither proceeds
along suspect lines nor infringes fundamental constitutional rights must be
upheld against equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable
state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification."
167. Se, e.g. Note, supra note 4, at 1914-16; Comment, Ballot Initiatives
and Gay Rights: Equal Protection Challenges to the Right's CampaignAgainst Lesbians
and Gay Men, 62 U. CINN. L. REv. 1055, 1079-86 (1994); Note, Colorado's
Amendment 2 and Homosexuals' Right to Equal Protection Of The Law, 35 B.C.L. REv.
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ics, however, explain why it is irrational for citizens to take action
designed to protect basic and significant liberty interests against
a restrictive regulatory agenda. 16 Important freedoms furthered
by the initiatives include economic liberties, associational interests, and rights of religious and moral conscience. Some of these
interests are of the highest order, and clearly provide a rational
(indeed, arguably a compelling) basis to support the initiatives.
America strives to be a free society, one which as a general
rule establishes a baseline of free choice and autonomy for consensual economic relationships. Therefore, entrepreneurs who
must meet the payroll and bear the risks of the market generally
are free to make major decisions about their businesses without
unreasonable interference from government. This zone of economic freedom includes the right to make employment decisions
and the right of exclusive possession of property.69 Indeed, the
Supreme Court of the United States recently reaffirmed that the
"right to exclude others is 'one of the most essential sticks in the
bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property.' ""' Typically, homosexual rights laws restrict these basic
economic liberties.
221, 256-57 (1993). For a lower court decision striking down a law similar to
Amendment Two under the rational basis test, see Citizens for Responsible
Behavior v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 648 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
Overlooking important civil liberties interests furthered by the proposed
charter amendment, the court asserted that it was designed to encourage
private discrimination and had "no other visible end." Id.at 658. This
unsupported conclusion could be reached only by the court's turning a blind
eye to the many important interests which would have been served by the
proposed amendment.
168. As we have already seen, gay rights legislation stigmatizes,
marginalizes, and fences out many groups and individuals, and initiatives like
Amendment Two serve to remove this stigma and protect the ability of all
groups to participate in our diverse and pluralistic society free of government
imposed burdens and discouragement. See supra Section V.
169. See Duncan, supra note 7, at 399. Generally, employers are free to
hire or fire in accordance with their business judgment, and employees are
equally free to accept offers of employment or not as it may please them.
Historically, the law of landlord and tenant has also been governed by the
principles of choice and mutual consent - landlords and tenants generally are
free to enter into leases (or not) with whomever they choose and on any basis
they choose. Id
170. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2320 (1994) (quoting Kaiser
Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979)). As Professor Richard Epstein
recently observed in an essay on religious freedom in the welfare and regulatory
state: "The protection of private property does more than promote market
efficiency; it enhances the level of human freedom in 'the most intimate and
personal parts of our lives." Richard A. Epstein, The Welfare State's Threat to
Religion, WALL ST. J., July 27, 1994, at A15.
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Moreover, homosexual rights laws often conflict with one of
the most fundamental human rights, freedom of religion.'
When these laws are enacted, individuals with deep religious convictions, such as a devoutly Catholic landlord who believes it is
sinful for him to rent an apartment to a homosexual couple, are
often forced to disobey or displease God, in order to obey Caesar.'72 Similarly, non-religious individuals may have deep ethical
convictions that are overridden by these restrictive laws.1 73
Amendment Two and similar voter initiatives are designed
to protect these important liberty interests against infringement
by government, and this clearly constitutes a rational basis for
these measures. Indeed, although it is beyond the scope of this
Article, a powerful case could be made that a compelling justification exists for laws like Amendment Two. Only by resorting to
ad hominem and characterizing these important freedoms as
"based exclusively upon dislike for gay people" or upon "irra-

171. See supranotes 152-62 and accompanying text. See also Duncan, supra
note 7. Earlier this year, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that
a landlord's right to religious freedom was "substantially burdened" by
operation of a Massachusetts law forbidding marital status discrimination in
housing. Attorney General v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233, 238 (Ma. 1994). The
court held that the effect of the law was to require the defendants, two devoutly
Catholic brothers who owned a four-unit apartment house, "to enter into a
contract contrary to their religious beliefs." Id at 237. In his dissenting
opinion in Evans II, Justice Erickson explained that homosexual rights
ordinances passed in Aspen and Boulder were particularly destructive of
religious freedom. For example, the Aspen ordinance "required churches to
open their facilities to homosexual organizations if the facilities were opened to
any community organization." Evans v. Romer, Nos. 94SA48, 94SA128, 1994
Colo. LEXIS 779 at *92 (Colo. Oct, 11, 1994) (EricksonJ. dissenting). Thus, if
a church opened its facilities to a local right-to-life group, it was required to
allow equal access to homosexual organizations.
172. Desiles, 636 N.E.2d at 237-38. See supra note 171. The court noted
that in addition to the "significant sanctions" imposed for violation of
antidiscrimation laws, "nonconformity to the law and any related publicity may
stigmatize the defendants in the eyes of many" and thus further burden
religious freedom. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d at 237-38.
173. See, e.g., United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 166 (1965), a case
concerning conscientious objectors and the military draft, where the Supreme
Court held that a sincere "belief in and devotion to goodness and virtue for
their own sakes" was equivalent to a belief system based upon the existence of
God. See alsoWelsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 344 (1970) (exempting from
military service "all those whose consciences, spurred by deeply held moral,
ethical, or religious beliefs, would give them no rest or peace if they allowed
themselves to become a part of an instrument of war.")
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tional fears" is it possible for critics of Amendment Two to conclude that it fails rationality review.174
In City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.,' 7 5 the
Supreme Court applied the rationality test and invalidated a
city's denial of a special use permit for the operation of a group
home for the mentally retarded. The city's action served no
legitimate interest because it was based solely "on an irrational
prejudice against the mentally retarded." 176 The zoning law
invalidated in Cleburne was completely unlike citizen initiatives
such as Amendment Two. The one was restrictive, the others are
liberating. The zoning law in Cleburne was a governmentallyimposed restriction on property, whereas the initiatives remove
governmental restrictions on business and property in order to
advance basic freedoms of citizens.
The Cleburne Court was very careful to make clear that the
zoning law was irrational only because government had singled
out group homes for the mentally retarded for restrictions not
imposed on other multiple-dwelling facilities. 7 7 Under Amendment Two and its progeny, however, employers and landlords are
not forbidden from hiring or leasing apartments to homosexuals.
They are completely free to do so, if they wish. The initiatives do
not single out homosexuals for restrictions or prohibitions; they
merely remove governmental restrictions on employers and
property owners in order to protect basic civil liberties in the
marketplace. These purposes are more than sufficient to satisfy
174. Note, supra note 4, at 1915. See also Note, supra note 167, at 256
("The only objective of Amendment 2 is 'a bare... desire to harm a politically
unpopular group.'")
175. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
176. Id. at 450. Since the Court could find no purpose for this zoning
restriction "other than a desire to discriminate against persons who were
mentally retarded," it concluded that the city had acted without a rational basis.
See 3 R. ROTUNDA &J. NowAK, TVRETISE ON CONSTi'TUONAL LAw § 18.3, at 39
[hereinafter ROTUNDA & NowAK]. Professor Laurence Tribe's analysis of
Cleburm reaches the. conclusion that the Court did not really apply the
rationality test in invalidating the city's zoning action in that case. Rather, he
argues', the Court "covertly" applied heightened scrutiny because of its concern
that without judicial intervention the potential occupants of respondents'
group home for the mentally retarded "would be left without appropriate
shelter." LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 16-33, at 1612
(2d ed. 1988).
177. 473 U.S. at 447. The city did not require a special use permit "in an
R-3 zone for apartment houses, multiple dwellings, boarding and lodging
houses, fraternity or sorority houses, dormitories, apartment hotels, hospitals,
sanitariums, nursing homes for convalescents or the aged .... private clubs, or
fraternal orders." ld. The restrictions prohibited group homes for the
mentally-retarded, however, solely based on an illegitimate purpose "irrational prejudice against the mentally retarded." Id. at 450.
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what the CleburneCourtrecognized and reaffirmed as the "general rule" - that legislation is "presumed to be valid and will be
by
the statute is rationally
sustained if the classification drawn 17
8
related to a legitimate state interest."
The Equal Protection Clause does not invalidate reasonable
and legitimate economic and social legislation.1 79 It should not
be used to stifle the desire of the people to protect their basic
civil liberties against the restrictive and stigmatizing homosexual
rights agenda.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Grassroots initiatives like Amendment Two are the product
of a populist revolt against restrictive homosexual rights laws.
These initiatives are an attempt by the people to protect their
basic civil liberties and to promote equal citizenship values.
Homosexual rights legislation stigmatizes, marginalizes, and
fences out groups and individuals who hold traditional beliefs
about sexual morality. Citizen initiatives operate to remove this
stigma and its harmful consequences by restoring government to
a position of benign neutrality regarding competing visions of
human sexuality.
When initiatives like Amendment Two are approved by vote
of the people, they are likely to be challenged under the Constitution by advocates of the homosexual regulatory agenda.
Although these legal attacks may have some initial success in
state courts and lower federal courts, they will falter in the long
run because Amendment Two and its progeny are perfectly consistent with the letter and spirit of the Constitution as interpreted
by the Supreme Court.
Homosexuals are not a suspect class, and there is no fundamental right for any identifiable class of persons to have its regulatory agenda insulated against the civil liberties of the people.
178.
d. at 440.
179. F.C.C. v. Beach Communications, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2096, 2101 (1993).
When reviewing legislation under the rational basis standard, the Supreme
Court "justices have determined that they have no unique function to perform;
they have no institutional capability to assess the scope of legitimate
governmental ends in these areas or the reasonableness of classifications that is
in any way superior to that of the legislature" or the people. 3 ROTUNDA &
NowA, supra note 176, § 18.3 (1992). Therefore, under this test the Court asks
only "whether it is conceivable that the classification bears a rational
relationship to an end of government which is not prohibited by the
Constitution. So long as it is arguable that [the legislature or the citizens] ...
had such a basis for creating the classification a court should not invalidate the
law." Id. This is a very deferential test; Amendment Two should pass it with
much room to spare.
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Initiatives like Amendment Two are rational and reasonable laws
designed to protect economic, religious, and other basic freedoms of citizens. Therefore, these laws should easily pass rationality review.
Charles Kingsley once observed that there are two kinds of
freedom, "the false where one is free to do what he likes, and the
true where he is free to do what he ought."i" ° Enactment of the
homosexual regulatory agenda shackles true freedom in the
chains of false freedom. Amendment Two and its progeny are
designed to remedy this injustice. These initiatives are not
unconstitutional and should be vigorously enforced wherever
and whenever they are adopted.
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